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This article conducts the very first empirical study exploring the contractual arrangements of
Chinese hedge funds, which are organized not as limited partnerships but as trusts. Using 139 trust
contracts collected by hand, this article sheds light on the structure, covenants, and compensation
mechanisms used by “sunshine funds,” the local name for hedge funds in China. It shows that,
while sunshine funds do have similar contractual arrangements as typical LP-organized hedge
funds, they also possess many undeniable differences due to the jurisdiction-specific character-
istics of China. In particular, because of the direct involvement of trust companies, sunshine
funds include certain covenants and terms that could both narrow the decision-making power and
dampen the incentives of investment advisers. New, but rapidly developing, sunshine funds have
been frequently targeted by regulatory efforts, which, however, come at a low level of consis-
tency and sometimes lack in-depth consideration. Growing out of gray regulatory areas, Chinese
sunshine fund managers have demonstrated remarkable competence in positioning themselves by
taking advantage of favorable regulations and mitigating the impact of unfavorable ones. Looking
ahead, it is of key importance that a proper balance is reached in terms of what role regulators
should play in dealing with the Chinese hedge fund industry.
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ABSTRACT 
This article conducts the very first empirical study exploring the 
contractual arrangements of Chinese hedge funds, which are 
organized not as limited partnerships but as trusts. Using 139 trust 
contracts collected by hand, this article sheds light on the structure, 
covenants, and compensation mechanisms used by “sunshine funds,” 
the local name for hedge funds in China. It shows that, while 
sunshine funds do have similar contractual arrangements as typical 
LP-organized hedge funds, they also possess many undeniable 
differences due to the jurisdiction-specific characteristics of China. 
In particular, because of the direct involvement of trust companies, 
sunshine funds include certain covenants and terms that could both 
narrow the decision-making power and dampen the incentives of 
investment advisers. New, but rapidly developing, sunshine funds 
have been frequently targeted by regulatory efforts, which, however, 
come at a low level of consistency and sometimes lack in-depth 
consideration. Growing out of gray regulatory areas, Chinese 
sunshine fund managers have demonstrated remarkable competence 
in positioning themselves by taking advantage of favorable 
regulations and mitigating the impact of unfavorable ones. Looking 
ahead, it is of key importance that a proper balance is reached in 
terms of what role regulators should play in dealing with the Chinese 
hedge fund industry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although lacking a legal or regulatory definition, the term “hedge 
fund” usually describes a type of alternative investment vehicle that 
possesses four general characteristics: (1) it is a pooled, privately 
organized fund; (2) it is administered by professional investment 
managers; (3) it is not widely available to the public; and (4) it operates 
outside of securities regulation and registration requirements.1 Although 
many private equity or venture capital (“VC”) funds also share these 
characteristics, those funds are distinguishable because they invest in 
unlisted portfolio companies for relatively long-term periods for the 
purpose of securing lucrative exits afterwards. As a class, however, 
hedge funds can embark upon a broad range of investments including 
equities, debt and commodities. They are often associated with using 
active trading strategies and employing sophisticated instruments (most 
notably short-selling and derivatives) to hedge investment risks and 
increase returns. Most of the time, hedge funds tend to focus on trading 
publicly-listed securities; in recent years, however, they also have 
invested through side pockets into those assets that are comparatively 
illiquid or hard-to-value, 2  thus indirectly broadening their coverage 
further to private markets. Therefore, it is important to bear in mind that 
there is a wide range of variations among hedge funds, and while some 
hedge funds do share some or all of these characteristics, others do not. 
Every hedge fund has its own investment strategy that determines the 
type and method of investment it undertakes. As a result, it is easier to 
recognize hedge funds than it is to define them.3 
Due to strong economic growth while major developed countries 
suffered from the global recession, China recently surpassed Japan to 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial 
Innovation, in BROOKINGS-NOMURA PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 23 (Yasuki 
Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/paper=931254. 
 2. Houman B. Shadab, Coming Together After the Crisis: Global Convergence of 
Private Equity and Hedge Funds, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 603, 608 (2009). 
 3. Hedge Fund Standards Board, The Hedge Fund Sector: History and Present 
Context, HFSB.ORG, http://www.hfsb.org/sites/10109/files/what_is_a_hedge_fund.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
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become the world’s second-largest economy.4 The value of the Chinese 
stock market has boomed. From a marketplace with only twelve stocks 
trading when its first two stock exchanges opened in 1990 in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen,5 the combined value of companies with stocks traded on 
China’s equities markets is now comparable to that of Japan’s, 
surpassing the latter periodically during the past two or three years.6 
Furthermore, the long-anticipated margin trading 7  and stock index 
                                                                                                                 
 4. David Barboza, China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 15, 2010, at B1. 
 5. Bai Haiyan, Ziben shichang fazhan dui gongsi zhili de zuoyong [The Impact of 
the Development of Capital Markets over Corporate Governance], 22 ZHONGGUO 
JINGMAO [CHINESE BUS. UPDATE] 83, 83 (2008). 
 6. The combined value of companies trading on China’s equities markets reached 
US$3.09 trillion as of August 16, 2010, compared with US$3.51 trillion for Japan, 
according to data compiled by Bloomberg News. See China to Surpass Japan as No. 2 
Stock Market, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 17, 2010, available at http://business.financial 
post.com/2010/08/17/china-to-surpass-japan-as-no-2-stock-market/#ixzz0xRYgQnER. 
China briefly surpassed Japan by capitalization in January 2008, shortly after 
PetroChina Co. debuted in Shanghai, and again in July 2009 as a consequence of the 
government’s 4 trillion-yuan (US$587 billion) economic stimulus program directed at 
infrastructure projects and shares.  
 7. Margin trading was officially legalized in June 2006 by Zhengquan gongsi 
rongzi rongquan yewu shidian guanli banfa [Measures for the Administration of Pilot 
Securities Lending and Borrowing Business of Securities Companies] (promulgated by 
China Securities Regulatory Commission [hereinafter CSRC], June 30, 2006), 
LAWINFOCHINA, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com, but only materialized on 
Mar. 19, 2010 when the CSRC designated six securities brokerage firms as the first 
batch of “trial firms” to begin the business of margin trading and securities lending. 
Mainland China Securities Survey 2010 (KPMG China, Hong Kong), Sep. 2010, at 6, 
available at http://www.kpmg.com/cn/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Page 
s/China-securities-survey-201010.aspx. The day before the official launch of the trial 
program, CITIC Securities signed an agreement with Jiangsu Winfast Investment and 
Development Co. Ltd., offering the latter credit limits of RMB 28 million for margin 
trading and RMB 10 million for short selling. This is considered to be the very first of 
such transactions in China. See Hu Yang, China Begins Margin Trading Trial, CHINA 
DAILY, Mar. 31, 2010, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-
03/31/content_9668589.htm. Jiangsu Winfast is a securities asset management 
company, and has several sunshine funds (one type of Chinese hedge funds) under its 
management. See Jiangsu Winfast Investment Holding Grp., Company Profile, 
http://www.jiangsuruihua.com/en/article.asp?c_id=42 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011); 
Jiangsu Winfast Investment Holding Grp., Securities Trust Schemes Issued by Winfast, 
http://www.jiangsuruihua.com/en/article.asp?c_id=56 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
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futures8 finally materialized in the spring of 2010, so it is now possible 
to get credit quotas for margin trading and short-selling from approved 
securities brokerage firms, and to trade Shanghai-Shenzhen 300 stock 
index futures contracts. These technical developments, combined with 
considerable market capitalization and strong economic growth, 
demonstrate China’s great potential to become an important hedge fund 
market. 
Nonetheless, a “hedge fund” is still a very novel concept in China. 
Given that Chinese people’s familiarity with hedge funds is somewhat 
limited to anecdotal knowledge,9 the apparent existence of the Chinese 
hedge fund industry is ambiguous. Among other things, this ambiguity 
partially results from the general aversion in China towards the phrase 
“hedge funds,” due to the negative impression they left on South-eastern 
Asian countries in the 1997 Asian financial crisis,10 and more recently, 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Financial derivatives (specifically, futures) were officially legalized in March 
2007 by Qihuo jiaoyi guanli tiaoli [Regulation on the Administration of Futures 
Trading] (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 16, 2007), LAWINFOCHINA, available 
at http://www.lawinfochina.com, but only materialized in April 2010 when the 
Shanghai-Shenzhen 300 stock index futures contracts, the very first of such in China, 
were listed on the China Financial Futures Exchange. See Mainland China Securities 
Survey 2010, supra note 7, at 8. 
 9. For a collection of anecdotal articles on hedge funds in China, see generally 
Richard Wilson, China – Hedge Funds: Guide to Hedge Funds in China, 
HEDGEFUNDBLOGGER.COM, http://richard-wilson.blogspot.com/2008/05/china-hedge-
funds-hedge-funds-in-china.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2011). 
 10. Hedge funds have been charged with playing a pivotal role in the 1997-98 
Asian financial crisis due to their involvement in large transactions they have done in 
various Asian currency markets, such as Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and then 
Hong Kong, South Korea, etc. In particular, the then Prime Minister of Malaysia 
blamed hedge fund manager George Soros for “attacks in the marketplace on the 
Malaysian ringgit and other currencies in order to generate profits for themselves 
without regard to the livelihood of the Malaysian or other local people.” See DICK K. 
NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE 1997-98 ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS (1998), 
available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/crs-asia2.htm; see also Barry Eichengreen & 
Donald Mathieson, Hedge Funds, What Do We Really Know?, ECON ISSUES No. 19, 
International Monetary Fund (1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs 
/ft/issues/issues19/index.htm#5. However, it is also submitted that despite these 
allegations, there is no empirical evidence that George Soros, or any other hedge fund 
managers, were responsible for the crisis. See Stephen J. Brown et al., Hedge Funds 
and the Asian Currency Crisis, 26 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 95 (2000). 
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accusations against them in the 2008 global financial crisis.11 As such, it 
would be unwise and difficult for private investment managers to raise a 
fund in China under a name that the public generally associates with a 
negative image. Rather, the hedge-fund-like investment vehicles are 
referred to as “sunshine privately offered funds,”12 which can sound 
quite odd to outsiders. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to these funds 
as “sunshine funds” in this article. 
Another important factor contributing to the dearth of information 
on Chinese hedge funds is their unique organizational structure. In the 
United States, which has the world’s most developed hedge fund 
industry, 13  the limited partnership (“LP”) prevails as the prevalent 
business form for a hedge fund.14 On the one hand, fund managers act as 
general partners, actively managing the fund and bearing unlimited 
liability.15 On the other hand, investors are passive limited partners who 
                                                                                                                 
 11. The financial crisis of 2008 has led to renewed debate about the impact of 
hedge funds on the functioning of financial markets. Although it is largely recognized 
that hedge funds should not be blamed for causing the crisis, there seems to be a 
consensus among regulators in the world that they should be more regulated, which is 
arguably stems more from a political fear for being criticized if no scapegoat can be 
spotted rather than from a real need. See Anne C. Rivière, The Future of Hedge Fund 
Regulation: A Comparative Approach: United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, 
and Germany, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263, 291 (2011). 
 12. The term “sunshine privately offered funds” is a literal translation of the 
corresponding Chinese. For a brief introduction of sunshine funds, see 
http://www.asimu.com/knowledge/infocontent/1238/41297.html. Because this type of 
fund uses a trust to raise capital from investors and then manages the raised capital for 
them, they are legal and thus “under the sunshine.” In contrast, those funds that do not 
use the trust form may face various challenges such as ambiguous legal status, thus they 
operate “in the shadow.” Therefore, this name is actually a vivid depiction of those 
privately offered funds, using the trust as their business form, and primarily focusing on 
investing in publicly listed securities. Sunshine funds, particularly the unstructured ones 
(further discussion in Part II.B), are considered comparable to hedge funds, in that that 
they both aim to pursue absolute returns and have similar fee structures. See 
http://www.crctrust.com/cgi-bin/web/TemplateAction?catalogNo=ywgl,smzs.  
 13. As of the end of 2009, the US was the largest management center for hedge 
funds and also the leading location for management of hedge fund assets with over two-
thirds of the total. See International Financial Services London, IFSL Research Hedge 
Funds 2010, THECITYUK.com, (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.thecityuk.com 
/assets/Uploads/Hedge-funds-2010.pdf. 
 14. DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 88 (2008). 
 15. Jacob Preiserowicz, The New Regulatory Regime for Hedge Funds: Has the 
SEC Gone Down the Wrong Path?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 807, 812 (2005). In 
practice, however, the “actual” general partner of a fund is often not the fund manager 
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are shielded with limited liability protection but have to leave 
investment decisions to general partners. 16  One important feature 
common to virtually all LP-type hedge funds is their fee structure, 
typically consisting of a management fee of 2% and a performance fee 
of 20%.17 This structure heavily incentivizes managers to generate good 
performance for investors. In contrast, no Chinese hedge fund was 
formed as a LP until March 2010, when the first LP-type private 
securities investment fund was created in Beijing.18 Although limited 
partnerships have been legally authorized in China since 2007,19 only 31 
private securities investment funds were identified as LPs as of the end 
of 2011.20 Arguably, the low usage of LPs among Chinese hedge funds 
may be a result of the fact that there are virtually no precedents available 
to regulators, practitioners, and taxation authorities on how to deal with 
this new business form.21 
                                                                                                                 
itself, but a management company set up by it. By doing this, fund managers are 
shielded by the limited liability protection of the management company, thus leaving 
the unlimited liability at the entity level. See infra notes 15, 28 and accompanying text. 
 16. Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm 
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1735 (2008). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Zhao Juan & Hu Zhongbin, Shouge hehuozhi zhengquan simu jijin tanmi 
[Exploring the First Privately Offered Partnership Securities Fund], JINGJI GUANCHA 
BAO [THE ECONOMIC OBSERVER], Mar. 13, 2010, available at http://www.eeo.com. 
cn/finance/securities/2010/03/13/165159.shtml. This first partnership fund is named 
Yinhe Purun, and is registered in Beijing. 
 19. Limited partnership was first legally permitted in 2006, when China amended 
its Partnership Enterprise Law. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hehuo qiye fa 
[Partnership Enterprise Law (P.R.C.)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 
23, 1997) (amended Aug. 27, 2006) (took effect June 1, 2007), LAWINFOCHINA, 
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com. 
 20. According to the database provided by Simuwang.com, a total of 11 funds were 
set up as limited partnerships for the entire year of 2010, and 20 funds for the entire 
year of 2011. See http://data.simuwang.com/product.php (follow “product type”; then 
select limited partnership; next choose 2010 and 2011 from under “year established”). 
 21. It is submitted that in order to enhance the popularity of limited partnership 
among privately offered securities investment funds, four difficult questions need to be 
tackled first. Among other things, it remains to be seen (1) whether these LP-organized 
funds will be equally attractive to investors when there is no trust company involved; 
(2) how LP-organized funds are going to properly entertain frequent subscription and 
redemption needs, given the statutory requirement for unanimous approval from all 
partners and changing official registration with the regulatory authorities when an 
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Instead of the LP form, the vast majority of Chinese hedge funds 
are created as securities investment trust plans based on a “four party 
cooperation platform” provided by various trust companies.22 This might 
explain the impression that China seems to lack a hedge fund industry – 
after all, these trust-like funds look quite different from the much better 
known LP-type funds. The very first trust-organized sunshine fund in 
China was created in 2004,23 yet the industry has been developing at a 
remarkable pace ever since. According to the Go-Goal Database for 
High-End Investors, there are altogether 703 trust sunshine funds in 
operation as of August 9, 2010, and the number increases to 838 when 
including those that had been terminated.24 Although it is undisputed 
that China’s hedge fund industry still has a long way to go, it seems 
equally unwarranted to simply deny its existence when a large number 
of funds are already in the business. Given the limited understanding of 
these trust sunshine funds, timely research into them is both worthwhile 
and practicable. 
Just as LP agreements provide insight into the creation and 
governance of American hedge funds, the best way to understand how 
Chinese sunshine funds are established and operated is to look at their 
“trust agreements for collective securities investment funds.” 
Fortunately, while hedge funds in developed markets are generally 
                                                                                                                 
existing partner exits or a new partner is brought into the partnership; (3) how they are 
going to safely keep and use the money from investors when the Partnership Enterprise 
Law does not make mandatory a custodian bank to be designated for that purpose; and 
(4) which governmental authority should be supervising LP-organized sunshine funds. 
Moreover, many questions also remain unanswered as to the taxation of limited 
partnerships and their investors and managers. See Xiao Yongjie, Yangguang simu 
youxian hehuo zhi sida nanti [Four Difficulties for Sunshine Funds Organized as 
Limited Partnerships], ZHENGQUAN SHIBAO [SECURITIES TIMES], Mar. 15, 2010, 
available at http://simu.howbuy.com/xinwen/178846.html. 
 22. See infra Part II.B.  
 23. This fund was called SZITIC PureHeart, created on Feb. 20, 2004 in Shenzhen 
and terminated on Jan. 15, 2008. The fund is reported to have realized an accumulated 
return of 370.86% as of its liquidation. See Zhang Bin, Zhao Danyang: Shangwu huigui 
A gu shichang de jihua [Zhao Danyang: Currently No Plan to Return to a Stock 
Market], CAIJING, Feb. 18, 2009, available at http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009-02-
18/110071131.html. 
 24. See GO-GOAL DATABASE FOR HIGH-END INVESTORS, http://www.go-
goal.com/inv_trust/basic/default.aspx. See infra Part III for further discussion of 
empirical data. Sunshine funds were filtered out manually by the author on the website 
provided. 
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considered quite secretive due to the much lighter regulation and 
disclosure requirements imposed on them, the trust-like sunshine funds 
are somewhat more transparent because trust companies in China are 
subject to certain disclosure requirements as supervised and regulated 
financial institutions.25 In addition, some fund managers also voluntarily 
publish information on their websites about the funds they manage. As a 
result, it is possible to obtain the trust contracts of some Chinese hedge 
funds. Using a sample of 139 trust agreements and explanations of trust 
plans,26 this article investigates the contractual arrangements of Chinese 
sunshine funds and aims to demonstrate how the salient terms of these 
trust plans govern the operation of sunshine funds. Particular attention 
will be given to those terms that control the roles of investment advisers 
and trust companies, who cooperate and interact with each other in a 
manner analogous to fund managers in American hedge funds contracts. 
Part I of this article provides a brief summary of the contractual and 
governance structure of American LP-type hedge funds, together with 
an overview of previous research papers written on the contractual 
arrangements of alternative private investment vehicles. Part II describes 
the current regulatory environment surrounding hedge funds in China. 
Finally, Part III discusses and analyzes empirical data regarding the 
structure, covenants, and compensation mechanisms of sunshine funds.  
 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Generally, trust companies must disclose to their clients and the relevant 
interested parties the key information about their business. For a collective capital trust 
plan, they must, at least for every quarter of a year, create a “trust capital management 
report” to disclose the major issues in managing the trust. They must also disclose 
weekly on their websites the unit net asset value of each of their securities investment 
trusts (such as sunshine funds). See art. 34-38 of Xintuo gongsi jihe zijin xintuo jihua 
guanli banfa [Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts Established by 
Trust Companies] (promulgated by the CBRC, Jan. 23, 2007), LAWINFOCHINA, 
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com; see also art. 15-17 of Xintuo gongsi 
zhengquan touzi xintuo yewu caozuo zhiyin [Guidelines on Running the Business of 
Securities Investment Trusts by Trust Companies], (promulgated by the CBRC on Jan. 
23, 2009), LAWINFOCHINA, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com. 
 26. See infra Part III.A. 
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I. CONTRACTUAL AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF HEDGE 
FUNDS 
A. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AS THE PREVALENT BUSINESS FORM IN 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT FUND INDUSTRY 
LPs are widely used to contain the business of both hedge funds 
and private equity funds. The popularity of the LP in the private 
investment fund industry can be attributed to two primary incentives: 
flexible contractual structure and favorable tax benefits. Limited 
partners are those persons contributing substantially all of the 
partnership’s capital, such as institutional investors, wealthy 
individuals,27 and sometimes other hedge funds (giving rise to the fund 
of funds).28 The general partner is a management company set up by 
professional investment managers, who are effectively shielded from the 
risk of unlimited personal liability arising as a result of actively 
managing the partnership and making investment decisions on the 
pooled capital.29  Unlike a corporation, LPs are not separately taxed as 
an entity, so that the fund’s profits and losses are passed through to its 
partners without any entity level tax.30 Compared to limited partners, the 
general partner only contributes a nominal portion of the total 
assets/committed capital of the partnership, normally 1%,31 but has the 
right of compensation much greater than its original contribution if the 
fund runs well. Such compensation is often referred to as the “2-20” 
mechanism, consisting of a fixed management fee, usually 2% of the 
total assets/committed capital of the fund, and a performance-based right 
to share 20% of the fund’s net profits. 32 Such an arrangement serves to 
incentivize the general partner to work hard and manage investments 
diligently, providing an effective solution to the principal-agent problem. 
                                                                                                                 
 27. JOSEPH G. NICHOLAS, INVESTING IN HEDGE FUNDS, REVISED AND UPDATED 
EDITION 16-17 (2005). 
 28. Id. at 39. See also Jacob Preiserowicz, supra note 15, at 811. 
 29. Id. at 40. 
 30. NAVENDU P. VASAVADA, TAXATION OF U.S. INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIPS AND 
HEDGE FUNDS: ACCOUNTING POLICIES, TAX ALLOCATIONS, AND PERFORMANCE 
PRESENTATION 5 (2010).  
 31. Simon Friedman, Partnership Capital Accounts and Their Discontents, 2 
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 791, 798 (2006). 
 32. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private 
Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008); see also Friedman, supra note 31. 
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The governance structures of a typical private equity fund and hedge 
fund are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 below. 
Particularly, the compensation scheme in hedge fund partnership 
agreements is usually identified by one important feature: high-water 
marks. By definition, a high-water mark is the highest peak in value that 
an investment fund has reached.33 As already mentioned above, such 
performance-based compensation normally amounts to 20% of the net 
new profits if the previous high water mark is exceeded. The prevalence 
of high-water marks among hedge funds might be partially explained by 
the high level of reliance on fund manager expertise. Since investor 
payoff is presumably based more upon the expectation of superior 
managerial skill and less upon the expected returns to an 
undifferentiated or passively managed portfolio of assets, a mechanism 
is needed to incentivize fund managers to demonstrate their skills in 
order to justify their fees.34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 33. William N. Goetzmann et al., High-Water Marks and Hedge Fund 
Management Contracts, 58 J. FIN. 1685, 1685 (2003). 
 34. Id. at 1686. 
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Governance Structures of Private Equity Funds and Hedge Funds 
 
Figure 1 
Private Equity Fund 
 
Adapted from McCahery & Vermeulen (2008).35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 35. JOSEPH A. MCCAHERY & ERIK P. M. VERMEULEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
OF NON-LISTED COMPANIES 187 (2008). 
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Figure 2 
Hedge Fund 
 
 
Adapted from McCahery & Vermeulen (2008).36 
 
Despite a certain level of similarity between the two diagrams 
above, hedge funds differ from private equity funds in that hedge funds 
generally invest in public liquid assets via a brokerage account, whereas 
private equity funds typically purchase stock directly in non-listed 
portfolio companies. As such, hedge funds need an array of service 
providers working around them in order to maintain their operations. 
Figure 3, below, lists the typical parties involved in the operation of 
hedge funds. Specifically, an administrator is appointed to maintain 
records, as well as to independently verify the asset value of the fund. A 
registrar/transfer agent is responsible for processing subscriptions and 
redemptions and maintaining the registry of shareholders. A prime 
broker provides access to stock and loan financing and serves as a host 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. at 186. 
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of value-added services.37 A custodian ensures the safe-keeping of assets. 
At the top level, the board of directors or trustee of the fund bears a 
fiduciary duty to the investors to ensure that all parties involved in the 
fund properly carry out their respective tasks. 38  It is submitted that 
outsourcing a hedge fund’s functions can help to minimize the risk of 
collusion among hedge fund participants to perpetuate fraud, and may 
also mitigate liability in the event that hedge fund participants are 
accused of improperly performing their management duties.39 
 
Figure 3 
Typical Service Providers for a Hedge Fund 
 
 
Source: Cumming & Dai (2010)40 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Douglas J. Cumming & Na Dai, A Law and Finance Analysis of Hedge Funds, 
39 FIN. MGMT. 997, 1001 (2010). 
 38. Id. at 1001–1003. 
 39. See Cumming & Dai, supra note 37. 
 40. Id. 
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B. COVENANTS IN HEDGE FUND PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS – HOW 
CAN THE CORRESPONDING LITERATURE ON PRIVATE EQUITY 
FUNDS BE HELPFUL? 
Although both private equity and hedge funds employ the same 
legal structure and “2-20” compensation mechanism from the outset, 
there are also pronounced differences between them in terms of their 
operations. Such differences result from the contractual flexibility of 
limited partnerships, which allows investors and fund managers to enter 
into covenants and schemes to suit their respective investment 
mandates.41 A straightforward example in this regard is differing fund 
terms. Since investments by private equity funds are generally highly 
illiquid42—private equity funds focus on buying shares in unlisted firms 
and only hope to harvest from there after three to seven years.43 There is 
a need to agree on a limited fund term at the expiration of which the 
general partner is obliged to return to limited partners the capital 
together with distributed profits. Correspondingly, general partners 
cannot access the full amount of the committed capital from the 
beginning of the fund, but they have the right to call in capital 
contributions once they have located proper investment projects.44 Once 
the capital is invested, limited partners then need to remain patient and 
are prohibited from redeeming their partnership units until the end of the 
fund. In contrast, because hedge funds primarily invest in publicly listed 
securities, their assets are comparatively more liquid and investors can 
get back their contributed capital through periodically-opened 
redemptions. This explains why many hedge funds are perpetual in life 
rather than having a fixed fund term, and why limited partners have to 
make contributions up front. 
While an in-depth comparison of the difference between the two 
types of funds is beyond the scope of this article, it is nevertheless 
necessary and inspiring to bring up the topic here. As mentioned in the 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See MCCAHERY & VERMEULEN, supra note 35, at 172. 
 42. Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, The Illiquidity Puzzle: Theory and Evidence 
from Private Equity, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 7 (2004). 
 43. Douglas Cumming & Uwe Walz, Private Equity Returns and Disclosure 
Around the World, 41 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 727, 728 (2010). 
 44. Ludovic Phalippou & Oliver Gottschalg, The Performance of Private Equity 
Funds, 22 REV. FINANC. STUD. 1747, 1750 (2009). 
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Introduction, a good way to understand how hedge funds are set up and 
operated is to look at their contracts, either LP agreements for typical 
American-style hedge funds or trust agreements for Chinese sunshine 
funds. Given the many similarities between private equity and hedge 
funds in terms of organizational structure and compensation 
mechanisms, a look into the contractual arrangements (covenants in 
particular) of private equity LP agreements will provide helpful 
guidance in understanding the contractual arrangements of hedge funds, 
which, however, have received scant attention in literature. The lack of 
literature on hedge fund contractual arrangements might result from the 
difficulty of obtaining access to the organizational documents of hedge 
funds; but it is more likely explained by the fact that hedge funds tend to 
rely much less on self-regulatory means like covenants due to shorter 
lock-up periods and the fund’s liquidity. Furthermore, those hedge fund 
activities that fall within the public domain, particularly in the market 
for corporate control, can also help to limit the principal-agent problems 
that may otherwise emerge. 45  The following paragraphs summarize 
important research on contractual covenants in the agreements of private 
investment funds, including both private equity funds, as well as venture 
capital funds, one of the most important subtypes of private equity. 
Although this information might not be directly useful in terms of 
drawing conclusions for this paper given the different topics and 
jurisdictions covered in this area, exploring methods of classifying 
covenants may be a good starting point for classifying the covenant 
arrangements in Chinese hedge funds. 
In their 1996 paper, Professors Gompers and Lerner studied 
covenants in a sample of 140 U.S. VC partnership agreements.46 They 
focused on 14 classes of covenants, which were divided into three broad 
families: (a) covenants relating to overall fund management; (b) 
covenants relating to activities of general partners; and (c) covenants 
restricting the types of investment. 47  According to them, contractual 
restrictiveness in VC funds, measured by the number and kind of 
covenants in the partnership agreement, is determined by two important 
factors, namely, the supply and demand conditions in the VC market, as 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See MCCAHERY & VERMEULEN, supra note 35, at 190. 
 46. See Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical 
Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1996). 
 47. Id. at 480. 
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well as the variations of the cost of contracting.48 When the supply of 
capital is large and the demand for the services of experienced, 
professional VC managers is great, fewer covenants are observed, and 
general partners’ compensation under the partnership agreement is 
higher.49 Such supply and demand theory is generally supported by all 
types of covenants.50 In terms of variations in the cost of contracting, the 
rationale is that because negotiating and monitoring specific covenants 
can be costly, and the ease of monitoring and the potential of engaging 
in opportunistic behavior may vary across funds, more restrictive 
contracts will be employed when monitoring is easier and the potential 
for opportunistic behavior is greater. 51  Such theory is supported 
particularly by those covenants restricting the fund management and 
investment activities.52 
In Europe, Daniel Schmidt and Mark Wahrenburg explored factors 
that influence the design of financing contracts in terms of covenant 
restrictions and compensation schemes between VC investors and 
European VC funds. 53  Their analyses focused on the impact of VC 
funds’ reputations and changes in the overall demand for VC services.54 
While conventional wisdom would assume established market 
participants care more about their reputation and have less incentive to 
behave opportunistically, thus requiring fewer covenant restrictions, 
their findings show that established funds are actually more severely 
restricted by contractual covenants.55 Moreover, empirical results also 
show that established fund managers with stronger reputations are more 
often obligated to make a capital contribution than first-time fund 
managers.56 Such results indicate that when established funds care less 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See id. at 470. 
 49. See id. at 488. 
 50. Id. at 496. 
 51. Id. at 464. 
 52. Id. at 493. 
 53. See Daniel Schmidt & Mark Wahrenburg, Contractual Relations Between 
European VC Funds and Investors: The Impact of Bargaining Power and Reputation 
on Contractual Design (Risk Capital and the Financing of European Initiative Firms, 
Working Paper No. 8, 2004), available at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/fmg/research/RICAFE 
/pdf/RICAFE-WP08-Schmidt.pdf. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 3-4. 
 56. Id. at 4. 
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about their reputation, stronger performance-related incentives may be 
concurrently used with more restrictive covenants in order to prevent 
opportunism.57 With respect to the effects of VC supply on contract 
design, Schmidt and Wahrenburg’s conclusion is opposite to that in 
Gompers and Lerner’s 1996 paper, in that Schmidt and Wahrenburg find 
that VC funds receive less base compensation and higher performance-
related compensation in years with strong capital flows into the VC 
industry.58 They interpreted such finding as a signal of overconfidence: 
strong investor demand seems to coincide with overoptimistic 
expectations by fund managers, which makes them willing to accept 
higher powered incentive schemes.59 
A later paper by Douglas Cumming and Sofia Johan in 2006, 
broadened the study by introducing an international dataset on 
covenants in contracts of private equity and VC funds outside the US.60 
They divided the covenants into five groups on the basis of Gompers 
and Lerner (1996), but incorporated, among other things, necessary 
changes to reflect the structure of non-U.S. funds that may be organized 
in various legal forms other than the LP. The five groups were: (a) 
authority of the fund manager regarding investment decisions; (b) 
restrictions on the fund manager’s investment powers; (c) types of 
investment; (d) fund operation; and (e) limitation of liability of the fund 
manager.61 Their central hypothesis is that the frequency of covenants is 
influenced by the quality of law of the country in which the fund is 
legally registered. Related to this central hypothesis, they also proposed 
that the frequency of covenants is influenced by the presence of legally 
trained fund managers. 62  They observed a statistically significant 
positive relation between the quality of a country’s laws and the number 
of covenants pertaining to fund operation (such as the sale of fund 
interests, restrictions on fund raising, and matters pertaining to public 
disclosure).63 Compared with the same amount of improvement in the 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 26. 
 58. Id. at 4. 
 59. See Schmidt & Warenburg, supra note 53. 
 60. Douglas J. Cumming & Sofia A. Johan, Is it the Law or the Lawyers? 
Investment Covenants Around the World, 12 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 535 (2006). 
 61. Id. 539-41. 
 62. Id. at 537. 
 63. Id. 
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Legality index64 among developed countries, such improvement in the 
Legality index among developing countries leads to a greater probability 
of including an extra covenant pertaining to fund operation. 65  With 
respect to legally-trained fund managers, a 20% increase of fund 
managers with legal training increases the probability of additional 
covenants pertaining both to investment decisions (such as the size of 
any single investment and co-investment) and types of investment (for 
different asset classes) by approximately 10%. 66  Taken together, 
Cumming and Johan concluded that while law and lawyers are both 
important, the presence of lawyers has a more economically significant 
impact on the use of covenants than the legal environment itself.67 
II. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
CHINESE HEDGE FUNDS 
A. ALTERNATIVE FORMS FOR HEDGE FUNDS IN CHINA OTHER THAN 
SUNSHINE FUNDS  
Before proceeding further, it is worthwhile to point out that the so-
called “sunshine privately offered funds” are not the only way to 
structure hedge funds under the relevant Chinese laws and regulations. 
The name “sunshine funds” typically refer to those funds organized as 
trusts and managed by private investment advisory/management firms. 
In addition to them, there are several other possible alternatives. 
First, securities brokerage firms 68  and public fund management 
companies69 can, upon approval from the China Securities Regulatory 
                                                                                                                 
 64. For the definition and derivation of the Legality index, see Daniel Berkowitz et 
al., Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUROPEAN ECON. 
REV. 165 (2003). 
 65. Id. at 567. 
 66. Id. at 568-69. 
 67. Id. at 571. 
 68. Zhengquan gongsi kehu zichan guanli yewu shixing banfa [Trial 
Implementation Measures for Client Asset Management Business of Securities 
Companies] (promulgated by the CSRC, Dec. 18, 2003), LAWINFOCHINA, available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com; Zhengquan gongsi jihe zichan guanli yewu shishi xize 
(shixing) [Detailed Rules for Implementation of Collective Asset Management Business 
of Securities Companies (for Trial Implementation)] (promulgated by the CSRC, May 
31, 2008), ST. COUNCIL GAZ. (P.R.C.). 
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Commission (“CSRC”), China’s securities market watchdog, engage in 
the asset management business by pooling capital from high-end 
investors, and creating and managing their own investment funds.70 This 
being said, nothing in the law prevents them from resorting to the four 
party cooperation model71 provided by trust companies to form trust-like 
funds. 72  In such a case, they will act as the third-party investment 
adviser to the trust fund. 
Second, trust companies are also allowed to pool capital by creating 
“collective capital trust plans” and attracting qualified investors to invest 
therein.73 If a private investment advisory/management firm asks a trust 
company to set up such a collective trust plan and to appoint the firm as 
the investment adviser for the capital pooled thereunder, a sunshine 
hedge fund can be so created. Of course, a trust company can also 
choose not to retain any third-party investment adviser and manage the 
fund relying wholly on its own expertise and skills. The three major 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Jijin guanli gongsi teding kehu zichan guanli yewu shidian banfa [Trial 
Measures for Public Fund Management Companies to Engage in Asset Management 
Services for Specific Clients] (promulgated by the CSRC, Aug. 25, 2011), 
LAWINFOCHINA, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id 
=8909; Jijin gongsi teding duoge kehu zichan guanli hetong neirong yu geshi zhunze 
[Guidelines on Content and Format of Contracts for Public Fund Management 
Companies to Engage in Asset Management Services for Specific Clients] 
(promulgated by the CSRC, Aug. 25, 2011), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub 
/zjhpublic/G00306201/201109/t20110902_199420.htm. 
 70. See Trial Implementation Measures for Client Asset Management Business of 
Securities Companies, supra note 68, art. 11; Trial Measures for Public Fund 
Management Companies to Engage in Asset Management Services for Specific Clients, 
supra note 69, arts. 7-8. 
 71. See infra Part II.B for further discussion. 
 72. Actually, because these funds are also organized as trusts, the Go-Goal 
database covers them. The primary difference between these funds and sunshine funds 
is that the latter are managed by a private, independent investment 
advisory/management firm, rather than a securities brokerage firm or a public fund 
management company. However, because such difference is not captured in the Go-
Goal database, the sample of sunshine funds used in this paper was hand-collected from 
the original data in Go-Goal.com. 
 73. This was first allowed under Chinese law in 2002 by Xintuo touzi gongsi zijin 
xintuo guanli zanxing banfa [Interim Measures for Administration of Capital Trust 
Established by Trust and Investment Companies] (promulgated by the CBRC, June 13, 
2002) LAWINFOCHINA, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com, which were 
amended and replaced by Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts 
Established by Trust Companies, supra note 25. 
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business models of trust-organized hedge funds are discussed in more 
detail in Part II.B, below. 
Similarly, commercial banks can design various asset management 
plans and sell them to various groups of their clients to pool funds.74 The 
pooled capital will then be managed and invested as described in the 
asset management plan. For those plans that target high-risk assets, 
and/or those that do not guarantee any fixed returns, banks may only 
pool funds from investors with previous investing experience. 75  A 
common way for commercial banks to conduct such business is through 
collaboration with trust companies:76 a bank entrusts the funds pooled 
from its asset management plan to a trust company, which will manage 
and invest the entrusted assets either on its own or by retaining third-
party investment advisers. It must be noted that such a trust is prohibited 
from investing in non-listed firms, should not be designed as an open-
end fund, and must have a term of at least one year.77 
To be sure, a number of differences exist among the 
aforementioned types of “privately offered funds” because of the nature 
of the financial institutions that raise and/or manage them. For example, 
the minimum capital contribution required by law to participate in a 
privately offered fund pooled and managed by a securities brokerage 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Shangye yinhang geren licai yewu guanli zanxing banfa [Temporary Rules for 
Administration of Asset Management Business for Individual Clients of Commercial 
Banks] (promulgated by the CBRC, Sep. 24, 2005) LAWINFOCHINA, art. 10, available 
at http://www.lawinfochina.com. 
 75. The minimum subscription price for those asset management plans targeting 
investors with previous investing experience should be RMB100,000. See Guanyu 
jinyibu guifan shangye yinhang geren licai yewu touzi guanli de tongzhi [Notice on 
Regulating Investments Made Under the Asset Management Business for Individual 
Clients of Commercial Banks] (promulgated by the CBRC, July 6, 2009), 
LAWINFOCHINA, art. 5, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com. 
 76. Shangye yinhang yu xintuo gongsi yewu hezuo zhiyin [Guidelines for Business 
Cooperation between Commercial Banks and Trust Companies] (promulgated by the 
CBRC, Dec. 4, 2008), LAWINFOCHINA, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com. 
 77. See arts. 3-5, Guanyu guifan yinxin licai hezuo yewu youguan shixiang de 
tongzhi [Notice on Regulating Several Issues Concerning Business Cooperation 
between Commercial Banks and Trust Companies] (promulgated by the CBRC, Aug. 
10, 2010), available at http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?do 
cID=201008120BD60A6611EE72C2FF98E47C97F36A00. 
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firm is RMB 50,000.78 In comparison, an investor must contribute at 
least RMB 1 million to participate in a fund pooled by a trust company79 
or by a public fund management company. 80  However, securities 
brokerage firms are not prohibited from raising their entry threshold to a 
higher level such as RMB 1 million,81  thus reducing the number of 
investors in the fund. Moreover, there are certain investment restrictions 
on the collective investment funds pooled and managed by established 
financial institutions, like securities brokerage firms and commercial 
banks, due to the need for risk management and diversification. For 
instance, a securities-company-created-collective-fund is subject to the 
so-called “double 10%” restrictions, namely, that the fund shall not 
invest more than 10% of its assets in any single security, and shall not 
hold more than 10% of the stock of any company.82 Such investment 
restrictions are not required by law for trust funds, while trust companies 
can surely apply them in managing their funds if they wish. Thus, the 
differences among various types of “privately offered funds” become 
nominal in light of their inherent similarities. Essentially, they all can 
satisfy the four key characteristics of hedge funds as set forth at the 
beginning of this article: they are pooled, privately organized funds 
administered by professional investment managers; they are targeted at 
only a limited number of investors, 83  and thus operate outside the 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Trial Implementation Measures for Client Asset Management Business of 
Securities Companies, supra note 68, art. 30. 
 79. Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts Established by Trust 
Companies, supra note 25, art. 6.  
 80. Trial Measures for Public Fund Management Companies to Engage in Asset 
Management Services for Specific Clients, supra note 69, art. 9. 
 81. In practice, securities brokerage firms actually do ask for a higher minimum 
capital contribution from the investors in the funds they pool. For example, Baoding No. 
1 Collective Asset Management Plan (raised and managed by Shenyin Wanguo 
Securities) asks for a minimum capital contribution of RMB 1 million, as  does Zijin 
Strategic Picks Collective Asset Management Plan (raised and managed by Huatai 
Securities). 
 82. Trial Implementation Measures for Client Asset Management Business of 
Securities Companies, supra note 68, art. 37. 
 83. To set up a collective asset management fund, a securities brokerage firm can 
only pool and manage the capital from a specific group of people, i.e., its own clients, 
or clients from its promotion agencies. See Detailed Rules for Implementation of 
Collective Asset Management Business of Securities Companies (for Trial 
Implementation), supra note 68, art. 6. As for collective asset management funds 
created by public fund management firms, there cannot be more than 200 investors in a 
single fund. See Trial Measures for Public Fund Management Companies to Engage in 
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onerous securities regulation and disclosure requirements84 applicable to 
public offered funds.85 
This article only focuses on one particular type of hedge fund in 
China, the sunshine fund, because among all of the types mentioned 
above, only sunshine funds are initiated and managed by private, 
independent investment management firms whose sole or primary 
business is to run collective securities investment funds. Trust 
companies have been involved because private fund managers could not 
otherwise legally raise hedge funds from investors in China before the 
LP form was officially allowed, and thus they needed a platform to 
legalize this process. This offers an explanation of the origin of the 
name “sunshine funds,” as hedge funds in China, which are otherwise 
illegitimate, are put under sunshine because of the possibility that a trust 
form can be utilized. 
As already mentioned in the introduction, the first LP-organized 
private securities investment fund in China was created in March 2010. 
Although it is immediately obvious that the LP form grants investors 
pass-through taxation benefits, its significance to China’s alternative 
asset management industry goes far beyond that. In simple words, the 
LP form provides a legally recognized vehicle that delivers the much 
                                                                                                                 
Asset Management Services for Specific Clients, supra note 69, art. 11. A collective 
capital trust established by a trust company cannot have more than 50 natural person 
investors, but there is no limit for institutional investors. See Administrative Measures 
for Collective Capital Trusts Established by Trust Companies, supra note 25, art. 5. 
 84. Note that, this is so only to a relative extent, i.e., when compared to publicly 
offered funds. The aforementioned collective funds do not totally escape regulation 
capture. For example, collective asset management funds established by securities 
brokerage firms need to be registered with the CSRC (prior registration). See Trial 
Implementation Measures for Client Asset Management Business of Securities 
Companies, supra note 68, art. 21. Collective asset management funds established by 
public asset management firms also need to be registered with the CSRC (post-
registration). See Trial Measures for Public Fund Management Companies to Engage in 
Asset Management Services for Specific Clients, supra note 69, art. 18. Collective 
securities investment trust funds established by trust companies need to be filed with 
the CBRC (post registration). See Guidelines on Running the Business of Securities 
Investment Trusts by Trust Companies, supra note 25, art. 11. Comparatively, setting 
up a publicly offered fund needs prior approval from the CSRC, and the disclosure 
obligation is much broader and more onerous. 
 85. See Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 1. 
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needed contractual flexibility to contain the compensation, distribution 
and exit mechanisms necessary to incentivize talented fund managers to 
work hard for their investors. Comparatively, such high level of 
contractual flexibility is not directly and fully offered by normal closed 
companies. Although the LP form was made available in June 2007, 
when China’s amended Partnership Enterprise Law took effect, 86 
Chinese hedge funds industry only began to use this business form in 
2010 because Chinese law did not allow partnerships to open securities 
accounts until the end of 2009.87 Before that, even if a Chinese hedge 
fund was willing to adopt the LP form, it could still not do business 
without a securities account. In comparison, because private equity 
funds only invest in non-listed companies and do not need such accounts, 
China’s PE industry enthusiastically welcomed the LP form and started 
to reap its benefits by using it to set up new funds immediately after its 
birth, 88  despite the fact that PE funds could also be organized as 
companies89 or as trusts,90 similar to sunshine funds. 
Theoretically, the emergence of the LP form in China is 
undoubtedly good news for private, independent fund managers, in that 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See Partnership Enterprise Law, supra note 19. 
 87. See Zhengquan dengji jiesuan guanli banfa [Measures for Administration of 
Securities Registration and Clearing] (promulgated by the CSRC, Apr. 7, 2006) 
(amended Nov. 20, 2009), art. 19, available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/ 
G00306201/200911/t20091127_173555.htm. 
 88. The first limited partnership VC fund in China was Cowin Capital, which was 
set up on June 26, 2007 in Shenzhen. Cowin was reported to have already successfully 
exited from two of its investments in 2009. See Jiang Fei, Quanguo shoujia youxian 
hehuozhi chuangtou jijin quxian tuichu [China’s First Limited Partnership VC 
Managed Exits Despite Detour], DIYI CAIJING RIBAO [FIRST FINANCIAL DAILY], Mar. 
17, 2009, available at http://finance.ifeng.com/money/fund/jjdt/20090317/450613. 
shtml. 
 89. Chuangye touzi qiye zanxing guanli banfa [Interim Measures for the 
Administration of Startup Investment Enterprises] (jointly promulgated by National 
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry 
of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, People’s Bank of China, State Administration of 
Taxation, State Administration of Industry and Commerce, the CBRC, the CSRC, and 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Nov. 15, 2005), LAWINFOCHINA, art. 6, 
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com. 
 90. Xintuo gongsi siren guquan touzi xintuo yewu caozuo zhiyin [Guidelines for 
Trust Companies to Operate the Trust Private Equity Investment Business] 
(promulgated by the CBRC, June 25, 2008), LAWINFOCHINA, available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com. Other than trusts, private equity funds in China can also 
take two other forms, namely, a company and limited partnership. 
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they can now set up on their own a private equity or hedge fund as a 
limited partnership without having to resort to the trust platform offered 
by trust companies. In practice, however, it is far too early to predict that 
the Chinese hedge fund industry will soon shift toward this new 
business form. The governance structure of the very first LP-organized 
private securities investment fund, named Yinhe Purun and managed by 
a firm called Yinhe Fortune (Beijing) Asset Management Co., Ltd. 
(“Yinhe Fortune”),91 is still substantially different from what is prevalent 
in the U.S. hedge fund business. According to an anecdotal report, the 
partnership was formed by no more than 49 limited partners,92 each of 
whom had to contribute at least RMB 300,000. Rather than a mere 
nominal portion of total capital contribution, general partners were 
responsible for financing as much as half of the partnership interests.93 
Given the reported fund size of approximately RMB 300 million at its 
inception, general partners should have contributed RMB 150 million 
into the fund.94 As reported, such a large amount was paid not only by 
Yinhe Fortune, but also by institutions with deeper pockets and acting as 
additional general partners.95 The fund has a term of only one year and 
expects a fixed target return of around 7-8% for limited partners.96 It 
will be forced into termination if its unit net asset value (“NAV”) is 
lower than 70% of the original purchase price of its partnership units.97 
Except for the fact that a partnership is used as its business form, such a 
set of contractual arrangements is distinct in almost every way from that 
of a U.S. hedge fund. The typical 2-20 compensation mechanism was 
abandoned because the game here is no longer about betting on a fund 
manager’s personal superior skills. This is understandable considering 
that the fund is the very first one raised in China using a LP as the 
business form, and the fund manager does not have an established 
record for raising and managing other hedge funds, nor a very deep 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See Yinhe Fortune’s official website, available at http://www.yhzc.com.cn 
/html/.  
 92. See Zhao & Hu, supra note 18. In China, a limited partnership can have no 
more than 50 partners. Partnership Enterprise Law, supra note 19, art. 61. 
 93. See Zhao & Hu, supra note 18. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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pocket.98 As an asset management firm with almost zero accumulated 
reputational capital and willing to set up its first and also China’s first 
LP-type hedge fund, it might be necessary for Yinhe Fortune to take out 
substantial capital contributions and secure fixed returns for limited 
partners in order to sufficiently impress them and make the fundraising 
easier to accomplish. It thus remains to be seen what kind of contractual 
arrangements will be used in subsequent LP funds, especially for those 
with more established managers. 
A. HEDGE FUNDS ORGANIZED AS TRUSTS: STRUCTURE 
AND BUSINESS MODELS 
As shown in Figure 4, below, although taking the form of a trust, a 
typical Chinese hedge fund trust engages a similar group of primary 
service providers as those included in Figure 3. Because besides the 
investors, there are four parties (trust company, investment adviser, 
securities company and custodian bank) that are also involved in setting 
up and running a trust-organized hedge fund in China, such structure is 
also often called “four party cooperation” model. The major notable 
difference between the two figures rests with the multi-identities of the 
investment adviser, and its interaction with the trust company resulting 
therefrom. Such interaction can be classified into three models in which 
hedge fund trusts can choose to operate their business. Interestingly, the 
three models are named after the place where they were invented and 
primarily implemented, namely, the Yunnan model, the Shenzhen model, 
and the Shanghai model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Yinhe Fortune was incorporated in 2008 and has a registered capital of RMB 
10 million. See http://www.yhzc.com.cn/html/index.asp. Both Yinhe Fortune and its 
key managers were considered “not well known” within China’s asset management 
business until the establishment of Yinhe Purun. See Zhao & Hu, supra note 18. 
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Figure 4 
Typical Structure for a Chinese Hedge Fund Organized as a Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Yunnan model, the trust company does not engage a third-
party investment adviser, but rather uses its own professional team and 
acts as the de facto manager and adviser to operate the fund.99 The most 
pronounced example of this model is a series of funds called “China 
Dragon,” which were created and are managed by Yunnan Trust 
Corporation.100 At present, there are altogether 22 trust funds under the 
name of China Dragon,101 the first of which was established in August 
2003,102 even earlier than the first sunshine fund that was created in 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See Zhu Xiaomin & Ding Ding, 216%! Yunguotou zaichuang shenhua [216%! 
Another Legend of Yunnan Trust Corporation], HEXUN, Mar. 12, 2008, available at 
http://funds.hexun.com/2008-03-12/104392658.html. 
 100. Id; see also http://www.chinadragonfunds.com/team.aspx. All four major fund 
managers for the China Dragon series are from Yunnan Trust. 
 101. See http://www.chinadragonfunds.com/product.aspx. 
 102. The first China Dragon fund, also the very first hedge fund trust in China, was 
called “China Dragon Capital Market Collective Money Trust Plan,” and was set up by 
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2004.103 It is worth noting that although Yunnan is an inner province 
located in the southwest of China, China Dragon’s performance is 
recognized even when compared to the highest-profile sunshine funds 
located Shanghai and Shenzhen.104 Note that because the manager of the 
Yunnan model fund is the trust company itself, it is not classified, based 
on the definitions in this article, as a sunshine fund, which only refers to 
those funds managed by private investment advisory/management firms. 
The Shenzhen model is at present the most prevalent business 
model employed by sunshine funds. The reason it is so named is that the 
two most representative trust companies promoting such a model are 
Shenzhen International Trust and Investment Corporation (“SZITIC”), 
and Ping An Trust Co., Ltd. (“Ping An”), which are both headquartered 
in Shenzhen.105 As mentioned in the introduction, the very first sunshine 
fund in China was created in Shenzhen by SZITIC. 106  The most 
distinctive feature of the Shenzhen model is that the trust company 
retains a third-party investment adviser to act as the de facto manager of 
the fund. The adviser will be responsible for establishing the investment 
strategy and creating a desirable portfolio to invest in, while the trust 
company only carries out the investment order from the adviser upon 
formally checking it. Thus, the trust company only serves as an asset 
management platform and a financial service provider.107 Compensation 
to the investment adviser consists of two parts: a fixed fee based on total 
assets managed, plus a performance-based flexible fee referred to as 
                                                                                                                 
Yunnan Trust on Aug. 1, 2003. See China Dragon Milestones, 
http://www.chinadragonfunds.com/Resume.aspx?Page=8. 
 103. See Zhang, supra note 23.  
 104. For example, the 2007 annual return of China Dragon Capital Market 
Collective Money Trust Plan was 216.44%, ranking No. 2 among all publicly and 
privately offered funds in China during that year. See Zhu & Ding, supra note 99.  
 105. See Shen Xing, Shenzhen niangzao simu fuhuaqi: Shenguotou moshi fengsheng 
shuiqi [Shenzhen Creates Incubator for Privately-Offered Funds: SZITIC Model 
Thrives], JINGJI GUANCHA BAO [THE ECONOMIC OBSERVER], Apr. 1, 2007, available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/y/20070401/10473461412.shtml. 
 106. See Zhang, supra note 23.  
 107. Though a controversial issue, this was confirmed by Mr. Lu Qiang, SZITIC’s 
Vice General Manager during a recent interview with him. See Zhang Xiaozhou, 
Yangguang simu yewu jintui zhidao [Future Strategies of Sunshine Funds’ Business], 
ERSHIYI SHIJI JINGJI BAODAO [21ST CENTURY BUSINESS HERALD], June 11, 2010, 
available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/fund/20100610/23358099889.shtml. For 
more detailed discussions of the roles of the trust company and investment adviser. See 
infra Part III, where empirical data are analyzed. 
 2012] AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF TRUST  89 
CONTRACTS OF CHINESE HEDGE FUNDS 
 
“special trust interests,” in the contracts, as distinguished from the 
“ordinary trust interests” – i.e. the returns enjoyed by the fund’s 
investors upon the trust units they hold.108 
The Shanghai model, represented by those funds created by Huabao 
Trust Co., Ltd. (“Huabao”) and Shanghai International Trust and 
Investment Corporation (“SITICO”), is a third business model employed 
by sunshine funds. Unlike the Shenzhen model, where all investors bear 
the same level of risk, investors in the Shanghai model funds are 
classified into a preferred class and a subordinated class (may also be 
called “ordinary class”).109 Subordinated investors are almost always the 
investment advisers of the fund (and/or its related or designated 
parties). 110   Subordinated investors are required to contribute a 
significant portion of the total capital in a fund. 111  Preferred 
investors/beneficiaries will enjoy a pre-determined fixed rate of return, 
usually 5% – 10%, which may be topped with some extra flexible 
                                                                                                                 
 108. The two terms used here (i.e., special trust interests and ordinary trust interests) 
are direct translation of the corresponding Chinese (i.e., teshu xintuo liyi and yiban 
xintuo liyi, respectively). They are used as the standard terms in the trust contracts of 
sunshine funds.  
 109. See Zhongguo yinhangye jiandu guanli weiyuanhui guanyu jiaqiang xintuo 
gongsi jiegouhua xintuo yewu jianguan youguan wenti de tongzhi [Notice of China 
Banking Regulatory Commission on Strengthening the Supervision of the Structured 
Trust Business of Trust Companies], (promulgated by the CBRC, Feb. 5, 2010), 
LAWINFOCHINA, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com, art. 1. 
 110. See Kong Peng, Shichanghua xintuo chanpin yeji gengjia [Market-Oriented 
Trust Products Show Better Performance], XIN CAIFU [NEW FORTUNE], Oct. 17, 2008, 
available at http://www.p5w.net/newfortune/qianyan/200810/t1952084.htm. It is worth 
noting that trust companies are explicitly prohibited from acting as the subordinated 
class investors. See Notice of China Banking Regulatory Commission on Strengthening 
the Supervision of the Structured Trust Business of Trust Companies, supra note 109, 
art. 7. 
 111. See Notice of China Banking Regulatory Commission on Strengthening the 
Supervision of the Structured Trust Business of Trust Companies, supra note 109, art. 6 
(requiring that “the proportion of investment from subordinated class investors should 
not be set too low”). In practice, subordinated investors can contribute between 40% - 
60% of the total capital. See Wang Chao, Qianxi zhengquan touzixing jiegouhua xintuo 
simu chanpin de shouyi fencheng moshi jiqi fengxian kongzhi [A Brief Analysis of the 
Return Distribution and Risk Control of Structured Securities Investment Trust Funds], 
8 ZHONGGUO SHANGJIE [BUSINESS CHINA] 3, 3 (2008), available at http://wenku.baid 
u.com/view/8d32bf3b87c24028915fc3bc.html. 
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returns payable if the NAV as of termination is greater than a certain 
pre-determined threshold. 112  Once preferred investors are satisfied, 
subordinated investors share what remains.113 If the fund loses money, it 
is only the investments from the subordinated investors/beneficiaries 
that will suffer from the loss, so as to make sure that the preferred 
investors/beneficiaries are still able to get the promised fixed return. To 
that end, subordinated investors/beneficiaries bear the obligation to 
contribute new capital into the fund, which is usually triggered by the 
NAV thereof falling under a certain precaution threshold.114 Since the 
Shanghai model funds have two classes of investors/beneficiaries, which 
are very different from each other in terms of risk and returns, they are 
also more often referred to as “structured funds,”115 whereas Shenzhen 
model funds are more often referred to as “unstructured funds.” 116 
Looking back again at the contractual arrangements of Yinhe Purun, one 
may have the feeling that the fund actually operates much like a 
structured trust under the Shanghai model – the distinction between 
general and limited partners reflects the structural difference between 
preferred and subordinated investors. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See Wang, supra note 111; see also Zhang Yue, Woguo xintuo xing simu jijin 
sanzhong moshi de bijiao fenxi [A Comparative Analysis of the Three Models of 
Organizing Privately-Offered Trust Funds in China], 23 XIANDAI SHANGYE [MODERN 
BUSINESS] 8, 8 (2010), available at http://www.cqvip.com/Read/Read.aspx?id=3494 
9103 for its published form [hereinafter Zhang, A Comparative Analysis]. 
 113. See Zhang, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 112. 
 114. See Notice of China Banking Regulatory Commission on Strengthening the 
Supervision of the Structured Trust Business of Trust Companies, supra note 109, art. 6. 
To give examples from the sample of contracts I collected, in the contract of a 
structured fund named “SITICO Sapphire – Hengda Tonghui,” subordinated class 
investors need to put money into the fund as soon as the unit NAV falls under 95% of 
the starting value. The trigger for another structured fund, namely, “SZITIC He Ying 
Structured,” is 90%.  
 115. For a complete definition of “structured trust business,” see Notice of China 
Banking Regulatory Commission on Strengthening the Supervision of the Structured 
Trust Business of Trust Companies, supra note 109, art. 1; see also Kong, supra note 
110.  
 116. See Qin Liping, Shenzhen moshi vs. Shanghai moshi: Yangguang simu liang 
panghuang [Shenzhen Model vs. Shanghai Model: Sunshine Funds’ Dilemma], DIYI 
CAIJING RIBAO [CHINA BUSINESS NEWS], July 4, 2009, available at 
http://money.163.com/09/0704/03/5DBMCO1Q00253B0H.html. 
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III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TRUST CONTRACTS OF SUNSHINE 
FUNDS 
A. SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION 
The sample used in this article consists of hand-collected contracts 
and explanations of the trust plans of 139 sunshine fund trusts. Data 
collection began with Go-Goal’s Investment Trusts Database.117 Within 
this database, one can find basic information about the name, inception 
date, trust term, trust company, prime broker, custodian, investment 
adviser, and manager(s) of a trust fund, as well as more advanced 
information of these items, such as the registered place of business of 
the investment adviser, curriculum vitae of the fund managers, fees, 
targeted return (for structured funds), and even the volatility and Sharpe 
ratio of the fund. 118  Such more advanced information may not be 
updated or complete for every fund and thus may require 
supplementation through further research. Go-Goal also provides real 
time data on the latest unit net asset value and annualized return of the 
current year for all of the funds in the database, as long as they are 
available.119  As of August 9, 2010, there were 1,230 private-offered 
securities investment funds organized as trusts on file in Go-Goal’s 
investment trusts database. 
To be sure, Go-Goal is not the only provider of data on Chinese 
private securities investment trust funds. There are also some other 
websites, such as www.simuwang.com and www.asimu.com. Compared 
to Go-Goal, the databases provided by these websites are generally less 
comprehensive and complete, particularly with respect to the non-basic, 
advanced information. That said, the most important reason that this 
study utilized Go-Goal over these other websites is that Go-Goal also 
collects information for those funds that are already terminated,120 while 
                                                                                                                 
 117. See http://www.go-goal.com/inv_trust/basic/. 
 118. See http://www.go-goal.com/inv_trust/Achievement/. 
 119. See http://www.go-goal.com/inv_trust/basic/. 
 120. Go-Goal database offers four basic filters: structured funds, unstructured funds, 
terminated funds, and existing funds. One can tick one or more of them to set the 
desired search. 
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such is not directly available from the other two websites.121 Including 
terminated funds expands the time range of my sample, thus permitting 
the consideration of certain changes that happened during different 
times and the extrapolation of interesting conclusions therefrom. 
However, the major disadvantage of Go-Goal is that it lacks effective 
filters to distinguish sunshine funds from those trust funds managed by 
established financial institutions, like trust companies, securities 
brokerage firms, and public fund management companies. As a result, 
one must manually count the sunshine funds to determine their number 
and detailed breakdown thereof. 
The total number of sunshine funds with clearly indentified 
investment adviser(s) in Go-Goal’s database from February 20, 2004 to 
August 9, 2010 is 838. The 838 funds cover privately-offered securities 
investment funds organized as trusts and managed by private investment 
advisory/management firms. As said before, this number excludes the 
trust funds managed solely by trust companies, securities brokerage 
firms, public fund management companies, commercial banks, or 
subsidiaries thereof, and (to the extent I am aware of) those funds 
pooled by banks and entrusted to trust companies via the “commercial 
bank – trust company cooperation” business model. This number 
includes those funds where both private investment adviser firms and 
established financial institutions (or subsidiaries thereof) are involved in 
co-management, and those funds managed by private investment 
advisers that are (whether separate or not) subsidiaries of industrial 
institutions and PE/VC firms but not established financial institutions. 
Several legal documents are required to set up a hedge fund trust. 
Beyond those entered into between the trust company and various 
service providers of the fund, the law requires a trust company to 
execute at least the following three documents with its fund investors: (a) 
the trust contract; (b) explanations of trust plan; and (c) the risk 
statement for investors subscribing into the fund.122 I went through the 
                                                                                                                 
 121. The database offered by Simuwang.com does not allow users to directly search 
for terminated funds. As such, it is not a very good choice to begin my research with, as 
I would not be able to know whether the database covers both existing and terminated 
funds (which would be ideal), without first knowing which ones are already terminated. 
With respect to Asimu.com, it offers a ranking system for existing funds based on their 
NAV and annual performance, and users can choose funds they wish to invest in by 
reading the rank.  
 122. See Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts Established by Trust 
Companies, supra note 25, arts. 10 and 15. 
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list of 838 funds one by one and attempted to obtain the trust contract 
and/or explanations of trust plan for each fund. Since there is no legal 
requirement to disclose these contracts/explanations, they are not public 
unless the relevant parties to a trust fund voluntarily disclose them for 
various reasons. The contracts I was able to obtain primarily come from 
websites of investment advisers and trust companies, and certain online 
document collection websites (similar to www.onecle.com) that allow 
free online reading but charge a download fee. These websites are 
particularly valuable in terms of collecting those old contracts dated 
from 2004 to 2007. 
In deciding whether to include a certain document in the sample, I 
focused on whether it expresses the major important terms of the trust 
fund, rather than whether it is literally named “trust contract.” There are 
a number of funds, for example some from Ping An, whose contracts are 
merely standard documents with general terms, while all the deal-
specific terms and conditions are actually contained in the explanations 
of trust plans that are ancillary agreements to the trust contracts. 
Furthermore, the fact that the sample contains trust documents for 139 
funds does not mean that every one of these documents contains all 
important contractual terms. This is particularly true for those 
explanations of trust plans, some of which do not provide, e.g., fee 
information or covenants. Nevertheless, they are included because they 
contain information useful in other respects, and the study uses smaller 
samples within the 139 funds when discussing certain contractual terms. 
Finally, it is necessary to point out that the contracts in my sample are 
unexecuted documents. This makes sense because, while it might be 
smart to publish unexecuted sample documents absent mandatory 
disclosure requirements so that potential clients may access them and 
consider investing, it is unwise to disclose confidential information, 
such as the identities of investors, to people not affiliated with the fund. 
As such, I cannot fully exclude the possibility that sample documents 
may have been amended when they are executed, especially when such 
amendments are demanded by those investors contributing a large 
amount of capital. 
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B. SAMPLE COVERAGE 
Table 1 
Comparison of Go-Goal Database with My Sample* 
 
 My Sample Go-Goal Coverage 
Total Number of Sunshine Funds 139 838 16.6% 
Terminated 7 135 5.2% 
In operation 132 703 18.8% 
Structured (Shanghai Model) 17 263 6.5% 
Unstructured (Shenzhen Model) 122 575 21.2% 
Fund of funds (including trust of trusts) 2 Not known** Not known** 
Number of Trust Companies 20 40 50.0% 
Number of Investment Advisers***  74 347 21.3% 
 
* All numbers referring to funds are for sunshine funds. 
** These numbers are not known for the whole Go-Goal database, as the information in such 
respects can only be obtained if the trust contracts/explanations of trust plans of these funds can be 
obtained. 
*** Among the 74 investment advisers, four are corporate investment arms belonging to industrial 
parent companies, four also run overseas hedge funds in addition to onshore sunshine funds, and 
three advisers are organized as limited partnerships. 
 
As shown in Table 1, above, the sample includes approximately 
16.6% of the sunshine funds in Go-Goal’s database. In particular, the 
coverage for funds in operation is 18.8%, and for unstructured 
(Shenzhen model) funds is 21.2%. The coverage of my sample is 
particularly low with respect to terminated funds, as well as structured 
(Shanghai model) funds. It is reasonable that contracts for terminated 
funds are harder to find, because there is no reason that investment 
advisers/trust companies should still keep them online after 
termination. 123  In fact, all of the legal documents for the seven 
terminated funds were found through several online document collection 
websites instead of the official websites of trust companies and 
investment adviser firms. Structured funds are easier to raise because 
                                                                                                                 
 123. A trust company or an investment adviser may want to upload to its website a 
sample of a sunshine fund trust contract, with the hope that a potential investor may 
want to invest in the fund upon opening the webpage and reading the contract. 
However, it will not make much sense to keep the contract online once the fund is 
already terminated. As such, it is much more difficult to find trust contracts for 
terminated funds than for funds in operation. 
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they generally are of a short term (normally one to two years)124 and 
secure a fixed target return to investors; 125  therefore, the need to 
publicize the legal documents to attract potential investors might not be 
as high as compared with unstructured funds. 
One may question the potential selection bias of my sample, even 
though it is collected from publically available data to the most extent 
possible. One may criticize that my sample has included 
disproportionally more funds initiated and managed by those less-
experienced investment advisers with potentially thin client bases. Such 
investment advisers may be located outside those big and/or rich cities, 
or young in terms of inception year, and thus are particularly keen on 
publicizing their fund documents to enhance their reputation to better 
compete with the well-located or more-experienced investment advisers 
and even attract investors from such advisers. This is indeed a valid 
point; yet a comparison of my sample with Go-Goal in terms of the 
location of investment advisers does not seem to lend much support to 
such criticism. As shown in Figure 5, below, the overwhelming majority 
of investment advisers captured in my sample also come from big, rich 
municipalities and coastal areas, while only some 5% of them are from 
inner provinces, which are generally considered as comparatively less 
developed. With respect to investment advisers’ inception years, my 
sample also shows wide coverage from 2000 to 2009. Figure 6, below, 
shows the distribution of the inception years of the investment advisers 
included in my sample (based on a sample of 68 out of 74 advisers). 
Comparing Figure 6 with Figure 7 (fund inception years), below, both 
charts demonstrate a spike from 2006 to 2007, meaning that the bulk of 
funds started to come into existence in that year. As such, it is 
reasonable that advisers formed in recent years are more often covered 
in my sample, given that hedge funds are an emerging business in China. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 124. For the 17 structured funds in my sample, four funds have a term of five years, 
one fund has a term of three years, two funds have a term of two years, five funds have 
a term of 1.5 years, and also five funds have a term of one year. 
 125. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 5 
Comparison of Go-Goal Database with my Sample in Terms of 
Adviser Location 
 
  
 
Figure 6 
Investment Advisers’ Year of Inception 
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C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
An interesting point arises if one looks at Figure 7 together with 
Table 1. As shown in Table 1, my sample only covers two funds of 
sunshine funds. Since I collected my data from public resources, it is 
difficult to control the types of funds when the data depends on 
availability. However, the actual number of funds of sunshine funds 
should be much bigger because in July 2009, China Securities 
Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited, the holder and manager 
of all securities brokerage accounts in China, suspended the approval of 
all new account opening applications by trust companies for securities 
investment trusts, based on the “concerns that the imprudent behavior of 
some trust companies may harm the reform of the system for new shares 
offering.” 126  Presently, this suspension is still in place. 127  Since a 
                                                                                                                 
 126. See Guanyun xintuo gongsi xintuo chanpin zhuanyong zhengquan zhanghu 
youguan shixiang fengxian tishi de tongzhi [Notice on the Risks Related to Certain 
Issues of Securities Accounts for the Trust Products of Trust Companies] (promulgated 
by the CBRC, Aug. 18, 2009), available at http://www.yanglee.com/flfg/2010/4/1 
9/13524.html. To be more precise, because every trust product can open a securities 
account, and a trust company can have many trust products under its name, some trust 
companies are abusing this by opening a lot of securities accounts to participate in IPO 
allotments. This is done to enhance the success rate of subscribing for new shares. See 
Ma Yufeng et al., Zhengjianhui yaoqiu xintuo zanting kaihu: fangfan duokai zhanghu 
daxin [CSRC Suspends New Account Opening by Trusts: To Guard Against 
Participating in IPO Allotments with Multi-Accounts], MEIRI JINGJI XINWEN [NATIONAL 
BUSINESS DAILY], July 14, 2009, http://bank.jrj.com.cn/2009/07/1407055498665.shtml. 
 127. The suspension of opening securities accounts for trust funds came out of “an 
oral notice from the CSRC to China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation 
Limited” in July 2009; however, more than a year later, there is now no indication of 
when it will resume. See Liu Zhaoqiong & Zhao Juan, Simu de “diren” [“Enemies” of 
Sunshine Funds], JINGJI GUANCHA BAO [THE ECONOMIC OBSERVER], Nov 1, 2010, 
available at http://www.eeo.com.cn/finance/funds/2010/10/31/184399.shtml. There 
have been rumors that the suspension would be lifted upon checking and cleaning up 
the current securities investment trust accounts, as well as upon the promulgation of a 
new regulation by the CBRC targeted at the issue of trust companies opening securities 
accounts. This new regulation would prohibit trust companies from splitting one fund 
for the purposes of opening multiple accounts and from re-using accounts left by 
liquidated funds for new funds. See Cheng Zhiyun & Zhao Juan, Zhengquan touzi 
xintuo chongqi kaihu; yangguang simu canzao wushang [Opening of Securities 
Investment Trust Accounts May Be Soon Resumed; Sunshine Funds However Remain 
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sunshine fund can only run its business with a securities account, it is 
reasonable to predict that, given such suspension, the number of funds 
established during the past year should be significantly reduced. 
However, this is not supported by empirical data, whereas according to 
the statistics of Simuwang.com, a total of 481 sunshine funds were 
created for the whole year of 2010, exceeding the number of funds 
created in 2009. This poses an interesting question - how did these new 
funds come into being despite the regulatory obstacle? 
According to anecdotal reports, newly created sunshine funds in the 
year of 2010 either managed to buy and use those old accounts 
previously opened by trust companies hoping that they would be lucky 
enough to not be detected by regulatory authorities,128 or, more cleverly, 
started to organize as trusts of trusts (“ToT”, or trust of funds, “ToF”), 
investing in other securities investment trust funds. Organizing as a ToT 
does not require a securities brokerage account, as the trust units of 
other trust funds are not publicly listed securities.129 SZITIC was the 
first trust company to start the ToT business. 130  According to the 
database provided by Simuwang.com, 16 sunshine funds were set up as 
                                                                                                                 
Hurt], JINGJI GUANCHA BAO [THE ECONOMIC OBSERVER], Sept. 13, 2009, available at 
http://www.eeo.com.cn/finance/banking/2009/09/13/151234.shtml. 
 128. See Zhang Huiyu, Yangguang simu xintuo zhanghu qiyue gaoji: mailuqian qibu 
150 wan [Shortage of Sunshine Fund Trusts (Securities) Accounts in July: At Least 1.5 
Million to Buy One], LICAI ZHOUBAO [MONEY WEEK], July 4, 2011, 
http://finance.ifeng.com/fund/smjj/20110704/4221735.shtml. There runs a regulatory 
risk for investment advisers to buy old securities accounts from trust companies, in that 
trust companies must cancel and clean up the opened but un-used accounts, and are, in 
fact, prohibited from re-using the liquidated but not yet canceled accounts. See Notice 
on the Risks Related to Certain Issues of Securities Accounts for the Trust Products of 
Trust Companies, supra note 126. 
 129. Huang Ting, Simu ToT chanpin shichang chuju chuxing: xinxi pilu butouming 
cheng yinhuan [ToTs Emerging as a Scaled Business: Lack of Disclosure Could Be a 
Possible Concern], DIYI CAIJING RIBAO [FIRST FINANCIAL DAILY], July 17, 2009, 
http://news.hexun.com/2010-07-17/124279881.html. 
 130. Note that, although SZITIC was the first trust company to start a ToT business 
within the sense of sunshine funds, the idea was created and implemented earlier by 
Donghai Securities, a securities brokerage firm, in its collective asset management 
business. See Dong Xing, Huarun xintuo jijiang tuichu zhongguo shouzhi “tuofubao” 
ToF [SZITIC to Launch the Very First ToF], HEXUN, Sept. 15, 2009, 
http://funds.hexun.com/2009-09-16/121112374.html. 
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ToTs for the entire year 2010.131 Alternatively, some newly incepted 
sunshine funds are identified as having a “double layer” structure: they 
first use a trust platform to raise capital from investors, and then the trust 
will invest as a limited partner in a limited partnership, which is created 
and managed by a sunshine fund management company as the general 
partner thereof. It is the limited partnership that will be directly engaged 
in the securities investment business. Because limited partnerships are 
now able to open securities accounts, such trust-in-LP structure then 
solves the account opening suspension problem which would trouble the 
traditional trust-based sunshine funds. Moreover, since a trust can 
contain a larger number of investors (maximum 50 natural persons, no 
limitation for institutions)132 than a limited partnership (maximum 49 
investors),133 having a trust as a limited partner can also help to broaden 
the investor base of a classic LP-based fund.134 Apparently, ToTs and 
trust-in-LPs are notable new trends of development for Chinese hedge 
funds, and it would be interesting to observe their sustainability in China 
relative to the classic LP-organized funds in future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 131. This number would increase to 36, if including those private securities 
investment trust funds managed by established financial institutions, such as trust 
companies and securities brokerage firms, etc. 
 132. See Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts Established by Trust 
Companies, supra note 25, art. 5. 
 133. Ye Defeng, Yangguang simu nengfou jiedao “xintuo hehuo zhi” baituo faxing 
kunju? [Can sunshine funds get over the new fund creation difficulty by making use of 
the trust-in-LP structure?], YICAI, Mar. 18, 2011, http://www.yicai.com/news/2011/ 
03/710888.html. 
 134. Id. 
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Figure 7 
Sunshine Fund Inception Years 
 
 
* For the year 2010, data ended as of August 9, 2010. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Trust Companies in my Sample 
City (Province) / Location Number of Trust Companies Number of Funds  
Beijing 4 13 
Shanghai 2 3 
Shenzhen 2 53 
Chongqing / Southwest 1 2 
Guangdong Province / Southeast 1 3 
Fujian Province / Southeast 1 5 
Heilongjiang Province / Northeast 1 8 
Henan Province / Middle 1 1 
Inner Mongolia / North 1 1 
Shandong Province / Northeast 1 9 
Shaanxi Province / Northwest 3 35 
Sichuan Province / Southwest 1 2 
Zhejiang Province / East 1 4 
Total 20 139 
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Table 3 
Trust Companies in Terms of Number of Funds Created (As of 
August 9, 2010) 
 
 Number 
of Funds 
in My 
Sample 
Number of 
Funds in 
Go-Goal 
Number of 
Structured 
Funds in Go-
Goal 
Percentage of 
Structured 
Funds 
Number of 
Terminated 
Funds in Go-
Goal 
SZITIC 
(Shenzhen) 
45 168 19 11.3% 18 
ZRITC 
(Heilongjiang) 
7 128 12 9.4% 37 
CITIC (Beijing) 9 118 38 32.2% 1 
SITICO 
(Shanghai) 
1 101 97 96.0% 75 
SITIC 
(Shandong) 
9 85 47 55.3% 14 
FOTIC (Beijing) 2 84 42 50.0% 16 
Ping An 
(Shenzhen) 
9 79 2 2.5% 4 
Huabao 
(Shanghai) 
2 51 38 74.5% 20 
SITI (Shaanxi) 32 39 9 23.1% 1 
XMITC (Fujian) 5 31 3 9.7% 2 
CCITIC (Beijing) 1 31 18 58.1% 22 
XITIC (Shaanxi) 1 25 16 64.0% 6 
CRTrust 
(Sichuan) 
2 15 6 40.0% 7 
BJITIC (Beijing) 1 18 1 5.6% 0 
Guangdong 
Finance Trust 
(Guangdong) 
3 11 1 9.1% 1 
Western Trust 
(Shaanxi) 
2 9 2 22.2% 1 
New Times Trust 
(Inner Mongolia) 
1 8 3 37.5% 4 
ZTTrust 
(Zhejiang) 
4 7 0 0.0% 3 
CQITIC 
(Chongqing) 
2 7 1 14.3% 3 
BRITC (Henan) 1 3 2 66.7% 0 
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 Looking at Table 2 and Table 3 together may generate some 
interesting findings. First, it can be easily identified from Table 3 that 
there are obvious concentrations of unstructured funds in Shenzhen 
(SZITIC and Ping An) and structured funds in Shanghai (SITICO and 
Huabao), respectively, despite the fact that all trust companies maintain 
a mixture of both business models to different extents.135 Only 11.3% of 
SZITIC’s funds and 2.5% of Ping An’s funds are structured, while 4% 
of SITICO’s funds and 25.5% of Huabao’s funds are unstructured. The 
underrepresentation of structured funds in the sample is most 
pronounced for SITICO, where only one out of its 101 funds is covered 
in the sample. Again, this is not surprising, given that the legal 
documents for structured funds are harder to find due to the reasons 
discussed above, especially when the funds are already terminated. 
Second, the funds located in Shenzhen and Shaanxi Province are 
highly concentrated. Out of the 54 funds from Shenzhen, 45 are 
contributed by SZITIC, and out of the 35 funds from Shaanxi Province, 
32 are contributed by Shaanxi International Trust and Investment 
Corporation (“SITI”). The concentration found in the Shenzhen market 
is relatively straightforward, as SZITIC was the inventor and very first 
implementer of trust-organized hedge funds in China and has been 
known as the “base of the Shenzhen business model” ever since. As a 
matter of fact, SZITIC is the undisputed leader in China’s hedge funds 
industry because it has the largest number of sunshine trust funds under 
its name. Although smaller than Shanghai and Beijing in geographical 
and population size, Shenzhen is fourth largest economy among all of 
China’s big and medium sized cities, with a GDP that is comparable to a 
middle-sized Chinese province.136 Shenzhen is also known for its spirit 
                                                                                                                 
 135. ZTTrust (Zhejiang Province) is exceptional. All of its seven funds were created 
in October and November 2007, and it does not have any other sunshine funds 
according to Go-Goal’s record. As such, the fact that it does not have any structured 
funds under its name is more likely due to the fact that the trust company does not 
actively engage in the sunshine funds business any longer after 2007, rather than an 
intentional focus on promoting unstructured funds. 
 136. See Information Office of Shenzhen People’s Government, Shenzhen 
Overview, SZ.GOV.CN, http://www.sz.gov.cn/cn/zjsz/szgl/201107/t20110712_167568 
7.htm (briefly summarizing the comprehensive competitiveness of Shenzhen’s 
economy). 
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of innovation, 137  especially for economic and financial development. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that it has managed to develop a cluster of 
hedge funds, which is also well represented in my sample. SITI’s 
dominance is also relatively straightforward. My sample contains 32 of 
all 39 funds created by SITI, representing a very high rate of coverage. 
SITI funds have such a high rate of coverage because SITI is the only 
listed trust company among all trust companies that engages in the 
business of creating and managing securities investment trust funds. As 
a public company, SITI discloses a set of legal documents of the trusts it 
created on its website, where I accessed the explanations of trust plans 
for the 32 funds. 
A very important reason for Chinese hedge funds to base 
themselves upon trusts is that trust companies, which are almost always 
state-owned financial institution and enjoy established reputations, can 
advertise and sell hedge funds trust units to investors138  much more 
easily and effectively than private investment advisory firms. That said, 
a trust company can only advertise and sell trust products within the 
province where it is registered, and must report and file with the local 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (“CBRC”) if it wants to 
advertise and sell trust products in other provinces. 139  Therefore, 
investment advisers prefer to set up hedge funds with those trust 
companies located in richer and more developed provinces, since the 
likelihood of quickly attracting high-quality investors is higher in these 
places. It is thus interesting to find that, compared with the location 
distribution of investment advisers, as shown in Figure 6, above, trust 
companies do not appear to exhibit a similar level of heavy 
concentration in developed and rich areas as investment adviser firms. 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Shenzhen was No. 1 on Forbes’s 2010 Rank of Most Innovative Cities in 
China. See http://www.forbeschina.com/list/776. 
 138. A trust company can surely advertise the trust plans created under its name, 
provided that it does not do so by directing its advertisement toward the general public 
or through public means. For example, it can place introductory brochures at its place 
of business, but advertising through public media such as newspapers, radio, or 
television is not allowed. See Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts 
Established by Trust Companies, supra note 25, art. 8. However, it can be difficult in 
practice to decide if a particular behavior should be allowed or not, e.g., sending group 
messages to potential clients. 
 139. Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts Established by Trust 
Companies, supra note 25, art. 7. More precisely, the report and filing procedures must 
be done at the local CBRC authorities both in its own province and the province where 
it plans to advertise and sell trust products. 
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Certain trust companies, like ZRITIC (Heilongjiang), SITI (Shaanxi), 
CRTrust (Sichuan), and New Times Trust (Inner Mongolia), have 
surprisingly more funds under their names than one would presume 
based on their location. After all, these places are all located in China’s 
inland and are by no means outstanding either in terms of economic 
development or financial innovation. It cannot be the case that the 
investment advisers serving on these funds are predominantly from the 
same province where the trust company runs its business, as there are 
simply not so many advisers located in these provinces (the total number 
of inland registered investment advisers in the whole Go-Goal database 
is only 20). Instead, they must have created most of the funds by 
attracting investment advisers from outside their own provinces. 
The question then is how did such trust companies attract 
investment advisers. One may argue that it is because these trust 
companies provide good services. However, their services are not likely 
to be so good as to compensate for the disadvantages associated with 
locating in less developed areas. Given that a hedge fund is purely a 
money-play business, it needs a cluster of either good brains 
(experienced and skilled fund managers) or good money (wealthy, risk-
tolerate investors) to develop in the first place. For a service provider 
located in a city or province that does not possess the inherent advantage 
to attract either good brains or good money, it may outperform its 
counterparts located in those places with such inherent advantage only if 
it can exhibit the innovation desired by the hedge fund managers. Thus, 
it can grow into a good service provider as a result of improving its 
service quality while accumulating more and more experience by 
serving a lot of funds. This is exactly the route followed by SZITIC and 
SITICO as the first movers of the Shenzhen and Shanghai models of 
business, respectively. 140  It is hardly convincing that a not-so-well-
located and less-established trust company can manage to attract a good 
number of funds purely by providing them with even-better services 
than those trust companies already with better location and more 
experience. 
                                                                                                                 
 140. It was SITICO that first created and applied the “structured model” (i.e., the 
Shanghai model) in setting up trusts. See http://www.sitico.com.cn/Sitico/all_info.jsp?i 
d=13, which provides a brief introduction of SITICO. 
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A more credible explanation to this question is actually quite 
straightforward and practical. As mentioned before, a brokerage account 
is needed in order to trade in China’s securities market. Before the lift of 
the ban on partnerships’ opening securities accounts in China, there was 
no better platform on which to base a hedge fund than a trust. As such, 
the most fundamental attractiveness of a trust company to an investment 
adviser is that it can open securities brokerage accounts based on the 
trust product contracts in its hands.141 While new investment advisers are 
always being incorporated, the number of trust companies is relatively 
fixed,142 therefore there is only limited opportunity to work with well-
known trust companies like SZITIC. Moreover, the potential dark side 
of those high-profile trust companies is that they are more prone to 
being targeted by potential regulatory intervention. In comparison, 
regulatory authorities arguably have less incentive to interfere with trust 
companies in less developed inner lands, as the number of sunshine 
funds created within their jurisdiction is still too small to trigger serious 
worries. In this sense, the likelihood of a sunshine fund being targeted 
by regulatory authorities143 is lower in less developed areas, meaning 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Guanyu xintuo touzi gongsi kaishe xintuo zhuanyong zhengquan zhanghu he 
xintuo zhuanyong zijin zhanghu youguan wenti de tongzhi [Notice on the Relevant 
Issues Concerning Trust and Investment Companies Opening Trust Exclusive Securities 
Accounts and Capital Accounts] (jointly promulgated by the CSRC and CBRC, Sept. 
10, 2004), available at http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?doc 
ID=1085. 
 142. As financial institutions, trust companies are subject to the supervision of the 
CBRC. A trust company can only be incorporated upon the approval of the CBRC and 
must obtain a “Financial License.” The same approval is needed when a trust company 
wants to change its business scope or open branch offices. See arts. 7, 11, and 12, 
Xintuo gongsi guanli banfa [Measures for Administration of Trust Companies] 
(promulgated by the CBRC on Jan. 23, 2007), LAWINFOCHINA, available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com. 
 143. Note that, a trust company does not have to obtain prior regulatory approval in 
order to set up a new sunshine trust fund. It is, however, required to report to and file 
with the local CBRC the necessary trust fund documents within 10 working days after 
the fund’s inception. See Guidelines on Running the Business of Securities Investment 
Trusts by Trust Companies, supra note 25, art. 11. This said, prior review and approval 
is needed if a trust company wants to open a securities brokerage account to hold 
securities and engage secondary market trading. See Measures for Administration of 
Securities Registration and Clearing, supra note 87. In this sense, regulatory authorities 
can easily kill a fund by refusing to give it an account. However, given the suspension 
on new securities accounts opening after July 2009, it is now impossible to open new 
accounts for trust funds anyway. As such, many investment advisers ended up buying 
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that it can be somehow easier and safer to establish a fund with the trust 
companies there. As such, and because the trust platform and securities 
trading accounts are needed regardless, investment advisers, particularly 
those newly-formed, less-experienced ones, may have to turn to non-
first-class trust companies even if they are located in less developed 
parts of China. 
Another important type of descriptive data is fund size. Such 
information, however, is very hard to find, as most of the investment 
advisers avoid disclosing to the public any information about the amount 
of money under management, while others only say a vague number 
aggregating all of their funds. Therefore, the data is mostly the expected 
size as stated in the trust contracts/explanations of trust plans, instead of 
the actual size as of fund inception. Similarly, funds are equally (if not 
more) unwilling to publicize information regarding the number of 
investors contributing capital. Therefore, it is impossible to know the 
proportion of institutional investors versus individual investors in each 
of the funds. Nevertheless, Figure 8, below, presents the distribution of 
sizes of the funds in my sample, as a reference. It can be said that, at 
least according to this chart, sunshine funds in China are still quite small 
in size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
the previously-opened securities accounts from trust companies to set up new sunshine 
funds. As already mentioned earlier in this Part, such practice is not lawful. As one 
might imagine, if someday the relevant Chinese regulatory authorities decide to 
investigate into such irregular practice, the likelihood for them to target those high-
profile trust companies in richer provinces would be much higher, because these trust 
companies tend to have a larger number of sunshine funds under their names, meaning 
that the probability of discovering wrong doing will be higher. 
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Figure 8 
 Size of Funds Included in my Sample 
 
 
 
Compared to private equity funds, hedge funds can have a 
perpetual term, 144  and investors can get in and out of the fund 
periodically on those days the funds are open for redemption.145 That 
said, most sunshine funds (90 out of 138) in China chose to have a fixed 
term, and the funds having unlimited term are mostly from SZITIC. 
Though not a big issue, adopting a fixed fund term is perhaps a safer 
strategy for new market players testing the water of the hedge fund 
business, so that potential risks will be contained in one fund for a 
relatively short period of time. If the fund runs well, parties can always 
choose to renew the term or transfer the fund into a perpetual one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Jonathan Bevilacqua, Convergence and Divergence: Blurring the Lines 
between Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 251, 260 (2006).  
 145. See George O. Aragon, Share Restrictions and Asset Pricing: Evidence from 
the Hedge Fund Industry, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 33, 36 (2007). 
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Figure 9 
Term of Funds Included in my Sample 
 
 
 
D. COVENANTS 
Having examined general features such as fund inception years, 
distribution of hosting trust companies, and fund sizes, I structured this 
article to focus on contractual terms of sunshine funds, beginning with 
the covenants. Before proceeding, I must make two points. First, the 
covenants discussed in this section do not refer only to those written 
explicitly under the “covenants section” of the contracts. Due to their 
higher level of liquidity, hedge funds tend to present a less complex set 
of issues regarding covenants and entitlement of compensation in 
comparison to private equity funds.146 Therefore, it is likely that the 
covenants’ section of a contract would consist of only a few explicit 
investment restrictions, while other more subtle, implicit covenants 
would be scattered throughout the contract and interwoven with other 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See Stephanie Breslow, Address at the New York City Bar Association 
Conference: Issues in Structuring Ownership and Compensation Arrangements for 
Private Investment Fund Managers – Hedge Funds (May 2006) (on file with author). 
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relevant terms. As a result, a limited approach might leave important 
covenants out of consideration. Instead, I take a broader approach to 
examine restrictive covenants by reviewing each of the contracts as a 
whole. Second, in grouping the covenants that appeared in sunshine 
funds, I primarily follow the classification in Cumming and Johan’s 
2006 paper because their sample included contracts from non-common 
law countries.147 Presumably, their classification should be more suitable 
for the purposes of this article, which deals with Chinese hedge fund 
contracts, than that of Gompers and Lerner (1996), which was based 
solely on U.S. contracts. 148  Needless to say, I made necessary 
modifications and adaptations to the five categories to make them more 
suitable for the Chinese hedge fund context. 
1. Covenants on the Authority of Fund Managers Regarding 
Investment Decisions 
While the hedge fund business is essentially a bet on fund 
managers’ personal skills and expertise in making good investment 
decisions, such a game should not be left totally unchecked for the 
purposes of preventing fund manager opportunism. In terms of 
investment decisions, this means that sometimes fund managers might 
have to honor certain percentage limitations on investment size. They 
may also be obligated to pay dividends to investors periodically, rather 
than letting the capital gains be automatically included into NAV for 
reinvestments, at the expense of risking investors’ profits. 
a. Restrictions on Investment Size 
Although Chinese law does not specify mandatory limitations on 
the size of investments by trust funds created by trust companies,149 
investment size is the most frequently used type of restriction among all 
covenant categories. Out of the contracts of 60 sunshine funds that 
explicitly provide information on restrictive covenants (usually in a 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Cumming & Johan, supra note 60, at 539. 
 148. Gompers & Lerner, supra note 46, at 477. 
 149. Chinese law only requires that a structured trust fund not invest more than 20% 
of the fund’s total assets into the shares of one company. Other than that, it does not set 
forth any other explicit restrictions on investment size by trust funds. See Notice of 
China Banking Regulatory Commission on Strengthening the Supervision of the 
Structured Trust Business of Trust Companies, supra note 109, art. 9. 
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separate section named “Investment Restrictions”), there is no single 
contract granting 100% freedom to its investment adviser in this respect, 
although some variations do exist in terms of the approaches used to that 
end, as shown in Table 4, below. 
 
Table 4 
Restrictions on Investment Size (N=60) 
 
Restrictions on size of investments in any single security (e.g., stock, fund, 
convertible notes, etc.) 
Number 
of Funds 
Prescribed percentage restriction to be set aside if the consent of trust company is 
obtained 
24 
Not more than certain percentage of the capital (total or outstanding) of the 
invested company  
51 
Not more than certain percentage of the capital (total or outstanding) of the 
invested company. To this end, the other investments by the funds under the 
management of the same investment adviser shall also be counted 
2 
 
Not more than certain percentage of the capital (total or outstanding) of the 
invested company. To this end, the other investments by the trust funds under the 
management of the same trust company shall also be counted 
10 
Not more than certain percentage of the total trust assets 60 
Not more than certain percentage of the portfolio containing the security 7 
 
b. Covenants on Dividend Payouts 
While restrictions on reinvestments are very important to private equity 
funds, this issue is not so crucial in the hedge fund context. Note that, 
hedge funds open periodically for subscription and redemption, e.g., 
once a month, once a quarter, or once a year, unlike PE funds that 
restrict capital withdrawals for several years once invested. If a hedge 
fund makes money while the fund manager does not want to pay 
dividends, investors can simply ask to redeem their investments on an 
open day at the then-higher NAV and leave the fund. The only 
difference is that, in most cases, the leaving investor bears a redemption 
fee, while dividends are received without a fee. Table 5, below, 
summarizes the various solutions to the dividend payout issue as found 
in 84 sunshine funds. 
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Table 5:  
Covenants on Dividend Payout 
 
How should a decision on dividend payout be made? (N=84) Number of 
Funds 
Dividends must be paid at pre-determined frequency and amount 3 
Dividends must be paid at pre-determined frequency and amount, but only 
subordinated investors can get dividends (for structured funds) 
3 
Sole decision of the investment adviser on whether to pay dividends or not 2 
Joint decision of investment adviser and trust company on whether to pay 
dividends or not 
55 
Sole decision of the trust company on whether to pay dividends or not 9 
No dividend 12 
  
Forms of dividend (N=74)  
More trust units 42 
More trust units, unless investors ask for cash dividends in advance 19 
Cash or more trust units 12 
Cash only 1 
 
It can be seen from the Table above that in 66 of the 84 contracts, 
the decision on whether to pay out a dividend is at the discretion of the 
investment adviser and/or the trust company. Investors are far more 
likely to get more trust units instead of getting paid cash. The Table thus 
confirms the perception that a dividend payout is not a big deal in the 
hedge fund context. That said, one should also recognize that dividend 
payments can serve as a good signaling mechanism for investment 
advisers and/or trust companies to show their confidence in maintaining 
the funds’ profitability, thus effectively enhancing their reputation 
among investors. Decisions to pay out dividends from time to time 
despite the absence of contractual obligation to do so can help keep the 
investor base at a reasonably stable size, because, otherwise, investors 
may soon seek to have their trust units redeemed due to impatience or 
disappointment. Relative to the practice of the past years, more sunshine 
funds paid dividends in 2009, recognizing the importance of keeping 
their investors after experiencing the dramatic plummet of Chinese stock 
market in 2008.150 For practical reasons, a dividend payout also serves as 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Zhang Ning, Biaogong huikui xinqie: yangguang simu fenhong [Reward for 
Reputation: Many Sunshine Funds Pay Out Dividends], ZHENGQUAN SHIBAO 
[SECURITIES TIMES], Jan. 18, 2010, available at http://news.stockstar.com/info/dartic 
le.aspx?id=JL,20100118,00001378 [hereinafter, Zhang, Reward for Reputation]. 
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a tool to adjust funds’ NAV at times when investment advisers and/or 
trust companies consider appropriate, e.g., to restore the trust unit price 
to its starting value at the beginning of every year for the ease of 
calculation. 
2. Covenants on Fund Managers’ Capital Contributions 
Under this category, I will discuss one very important and unique 
feature of Chinese hedge funds contracts: a capital contribution by the 
investment adviser, the de facto manager of a sunshine fund. To be sure, 
a general partner contribution is not a novel idea per se. In order to 
demonstrate that its interests are aligned with those of the limited 
partners, a general partner normally needs to contribute into the fund 
and thereby share in the good and bad times with limited partners. 
Without this covenant in place, the general partner will be less 
disciplined by the possible negative returns and risk, and may carelessly 
squander other people’s money because the general partner has nothing 
to lose. The amount of contribution is usually 1-5% in private equity 
industry, depending on fund sizes and business focuses, 151  and 
practitioners have submitted that the level for hedge funds is usually 1% 
or even less.152 The general partner’s contribution is generally no more 
than a slight percentage of the total fund assets because running a hedge 
fund is a risky business. An excessive share of capital by the general 
partner will backfire because fund managers may behave in a risk-averse 
manner and make overly conservative investment decisions. Rather, the 
combination of nominal capital contribution (1%) and substantial profit 
sharing (20%) encourages fund managers to take necessary risks in 
exchange for higher returns than other conservative investment vehicles, 
such as mutual funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 151. DAVID TOLL, PRIVATE EQUITY PARTNERSHIP TERMS AND CONDITIONS 31 (2d 
ed. 2001). 
 152. See Friedman, supra note 31; see also Breslow, supra note 146. 
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Table 6 
Capital Contributions and Holding by Investment Adviser 
(N=70)153 
 
Capital Contribution by the investment adviser as of fund inception (N=34) Number of 
Funds 
Minimum contribution required for qualified investors in the fund154 18 
Greater than the minimum contribution required for qualified investors, but 
less than 10% of total fund assets155 
2 
10% of total fund assets 12 
Greater than 10% of total fund assets 2 
  
Minimum holding by the investment adviser during the fund term (N=55)  
Less than 10% of total fund assets 7 
10% of total fund assets 45 
10% of total fund assets for the first few years of the fund 2 
Greater than 10% of total fund assets 1 
  
Percentage of incentive fees (if any) to be transferred into trust units upon each 
NAV day if the investment adviser holds less than the minimum holding (N=48) 
 
 
10% of incentive fees 12 
20% of incentive fees 7 
30% of incentive fees 1 
                                                                                                                 
 153. All numbers in Table 6 are for unstructured funds. Structured funds are left out 
of consideration because, although they always require investment advisers (as 
subordinated class investors) to contribute and keep on holding a significant portion of 
the total assets of the fund, see supra note 111 and accompanying text. The purpose of 
doing so is to secure the fixed target return for their preferred investors. Therefore, they 
are not really comparable to the typical U.S.-style hedge funds. 
 154. The minimum investment legally required to participate in a fund pooled by a 
trust company is RMB 1 million, unless the trust contract prescribes for a higher 
amount. See Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts Established by 
Trust Companies, supra note 25. An initial contribution clause requiring investment 
advisers to pay the minimum capital contribution required for other qualified investors 
in the fund is generally reasonable. It would normally result in the percentage of 
investment adviser’s capital contribution being less than 10% (in most cases 2%), if the 
calculation is determined by taking the minimum total capital required to set up the 
fund as the total fund assets. 
 155. For those funds that require the investment adviser to pay/hold a fixed, upfront 
contribution which is more than the minimum capital contribution required for qualified 
investors in the fund, I calculated the percentage of investment adviser’s capital 
contribution/holding versus the total fund assets by treating the minimum total capital 
required to set up the fund as the total fund assets. 
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50% of incentive fees 25 
No limitation, until the minimum holding is reached 3 
  
Percentage of incentive fees (if any) to be transferred into trust units, regardless if 
the investment adviser holds less or more than the minimum holding (N=10) 
 
50% of incentive fees, but only applicable for the first year of the fund’s 
inception 
8 
15% of incentive fees, but investment adviser has full discretion over how and 
when to dispose of the trust units transferred from incentive fees 
1 
100% of incentive fees, but investment adviser can, at discretion, ask the fund 
to redeem such trust units transferred from incentive fees 
1 
 
Table 6, above, presents a picture of the contractual arrangements 
in Chinese sunshine funds contracts dealing with the issues of 
investment adviser capital contribution and holding. The difference is 
straightforward. Instead of a nominal contribution and holding of around 
1%, the prevailing industry practice in China seems to be 10%, at least 
according to the Table above. Investment advisers can make their capital 
contributions in two ways. They can contribute upon the inception of a 
fund, or by transferring their incentive fees gradually until the required 
minimum holding is reached. A 10% capital contribution requirement 
would seem too excessive relative to the 20% profit sharing mechanism, 
which would dampen investment advisers’ incentives to take risks and 
over-perform. Note that, in order to satisfy such high capital 
contribution threshold, investment advisers may need to put a very 
significant portion of their personal wealth into the fund. If they manage 
to make good investments and bring in profits for the fund, they can 
only increase their personal wealth to a rather limited extent (10% 
capital contribution for 20% profit, compared with 1% capital 
contribution for 20% profit). However, if the fund underperforms, the 
fund managers get severely penalized as they lose a lot of their assets 
and will also find it difficult to raise follow-on funds.156 Unfortunately, 
the number of funds requiring such excessive capital contribution is not 
small. 
Although the second method of capital contribution does not 
require the investment adviser to contribute all of the required capital 
                                                                                                                 
 156. THOMAS MEYER & PIERRE-YVES MATHONET, BEYOND THE J-CURVE: 
MANAGING A PORTFOLIO OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 34 (2005). 
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upfront, it is still unfavorable because the requirement cuts into their 
incentive fees. After all, it might take some time before the investment 
adviser achieves the 10% threshold. This said, investment advisers 
arguably would prefer the second method to the first one, as they do not 
have to pay the whole capital contribution entirely from their own 
pockets. In other words, they are not made unduly risk-averse from the 
very beginning, and can still pursue an aggressive investment strategy to 
impress their investors at relatively low cost. In this sense, the second 
alternative better aligns the incentives of the investors and investment 
advisers. Among the contracts/explanations of trust plans of all the 70 
unstructured funds that provide information on the issue of investment 
adviser capital contribution and holding, 26 contracts are from SZITIC, 
and it is worth noting that all 26 contracts have followed the second 
method. Arguably, this perhaps explains SZITIC’s success in China’s 
hedge fund industry: investment advisers are willing to choose SZITIC 
because their terms appear more reasonable from the adviser’s point of 
view, and such reasonableness is delivered with certainty. 
A more important question under this topic is why a much higher 
level of capital contribution from investment advisers emerged in China 
in the first place. This mechanism was not in the trust contract of 
PureHeart, the very first Chinese hedge fund created by Mr. Zhao 
Danyang on the trust platform provided by SZITIC in 2004. Instead, the 
contract of PureHeart looked quite like a typical U.S. hedge fund in 
important respects, such as the 20% flexible performance fee. So if the 
whole industry in China was started by transplanting an already well-
tested business model, why do we now observe such a crucial difference 
in practice with respect to capital contribution and holding by 
investment advisers (general partners)? Three important reasons, in my 
opinion, provide possible answers to this question. 
a. Concerns of Chinese Investors 
One has to bear in mind that China has a civil law history. In such a 
country, statutes tend to be considered more serious than contractual 
terms in the sense that people believe that default legal provisions are 
more reliable than contractual arrangements, even when the former are 
often too rigid, formal and sometimes outdated, while the latter are 
carefully tailored to suit the specific business needs of the parties. A 
typical example to illustrate this point is the minimum capital 
requirement for setting up a company. Though a long abandoned idea in 
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common law countries like the U.S. and United Kingdom, Chinese 
people still seem to attach a lot of importance to the requirement and the 
amount of registered capital is often directly associated with the quality 
of a company.157 A high capital contribution number on a company’s 
registry documents gives its investors and creditors some “sense of 
security” about the money they are going to inject into company;158 
while a company with only nominal registered capital is very likely to 
be perceived as a paper sham.159 As a matter of fact, minimum capital 
requirement is also very often referred to by lawmakers in setting out 
qualifications for the relevant market players.160 For example, in order to 
be retained by a trust company as a third-party adviser for its trust funds, 
an investment management company or partnership must have at least 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Liu Yongguang, Riben gongsi ziben zhidu gaige de lifa shijian jiqi dui woguo 
de qishi [Reform of Company Capital System Legislation in Japan and What Can We 
Learn From It], (1) FASHANG YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW AND BUSINESS] 30, 31-32 
(2004). 
 158. Zhou Yu, Ziben xinyong shenhua de zhongjie [The End of the Capital Credit 
Legend], (2) DONGSHIHUI [DIRECTORS & BOARDS] 88, 88 (2006), available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20060207/18252323393.shtml.  
 159. Id. Around the end of the 1980s, China witnessed a wave of new company 
establishments. Because there lacked legal authority to regulate corporations (Chinese 
company law first came into being only in 1993), many sham companies were set up 
without capital in them, and many abusive and fraudulent business activities were found 
to be associated with these companies. It was against this background that Chinese 
company law was enacted, with relatively high registered capital requirements. See Jin 
Jianfeng, Gongsi renge fouren lilun jiqi zai woguo de shijian [The Theory of Disregard 
of Corporate Personality and its Implementation in China], (2) ZHONGGUO FAXUE 
[CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE] 118, 122-123 (2005). As such, it is quite likely that a company 
with only nominal registered capital may leave people with the impression that it is a 
paper sham. 
 160. Many laws and regulations in China, as long as they involve setting out the 
qualifications for certain market players (e.g., what qualifications must be met in order 
to be able to engage in certain business), include requirements for the minimum capital 
in a company. In these cases, the default minimum capital requirements as set out in 
Chinese Company Law are no longer applicable. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
gongsi fa [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993) (amended Dec. 25, 1999, Aug. 28, 2004, and Oct. 27, 
2005), LAWINFOCHINA, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com, arts. 26 and 81. For 
a tip-of-the-iceberg picture of the different minimum capital requirements for 
companies in various lines of business, see http://www.investsjs.gov.cn/a/service/touz 
iliucheng/1355.html. 
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RMB 10 million paid up capital;161 as for a trust company, the law 
requires for at least RMB 300 million registered capital, which must be 
already fully paid up.162 
By the same token, investors in China may find it hard to accept 
when a fund manager is going to use their money at his discretion and 
share one-fifth of what they are going to earn, while the manager only 
contributes a nominal amount relative to what investors have invested. 
In some sense, this could also sound like a sham. Comparatively, a 10% 
capital contribution will better bind the adviser, and the business will 
look more serious in the eyes of investors. Given that the idea of hedge 
funds is still so novel, and that the whole scheme is based on contracts, 
the requirement that investment adviser contributes at least 10% of the 
fund’s total assets serves as a quasi-legal mechanism to provide the 
needed sense of security to investors. This argument echoes the thesis of 
a paper by Professors Lerner and Schoar in 2005.163 They found that, in 
a private equity investment context, transactions in low enforcement and 
civil law nations tend to use common stock and debt, and rely on more 
rigid yet straightforward mechanisms such as equity and board control 
to monitor portfolio companies, instead of convertible preferred stock, 
which is more flexible yet more contractual in nature, as seen in 
common law countries. 164  Similarly, the higher investment adviser 
contribution requirement used in the Chinese hedge fund contract 
context serves as a more rigid and straightforward mechanism to make 
up for the general unfamiliarity and uncertainty of Chinese investors 
towards the new business, reflecting of the civil law culture in China. 
b. Liability Concerns of Trust Companies 
If an investment adviser underperforms and the sunshine fund 
under its management loses money, the reputation of the trust company 
will also be negatively affected because the fund is created and operated 
under its name. From a formal point of view, a trust company is the one 
signing the trust contract directly with the investors, while the 
investment adviser is standing one step back being the third-party 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See Guidelines on Running the Business of Securities Investment Trusts by 
Trust Companies, supra note 25, art. 22. 
 162. See Measures for Administration of Trust Companies, supra note 142, art. 10. 
 163. Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial 
Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private Equity, 120 Q.J. ECON. 223 (2005). 
 164. Id. at 223. 
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service provider retained by the trust company through an advisory 
service agreement. As such, a trust company would have the incentive to 
preserve its reputation as a reliable market player. It need to have some 
reliable mechanisms to ensure that if the investment adviser fails to 
bring in good returns for a sunshine fund, disgruntled investors of that 
fund will not make its life too difficult. With a high investment adviser 
capital contribution at the outset, the investors may feel that their losses 
are at least partially shared by the person who caused the losses. 
Otherwise, annoyed investors will first blame the trust company for not 
installing a mechanism to hold the investment adviser accountable, and 
liability on the part of trust company may even be triggered. In this 
sense, it is understandable that most trust companies have included this 
requirement in their contracts, despite the incentive-dampening effect it 
is likely to have on investment advisers. 
 
c. Legal Restrictions 
 
A recent regulation, namely, Guidelines on Running the Business 
of Securities Investment Trusts by Trust Companies, which took effect 
in February 2009,165 permitted trust companies to charge management 
fees and performance-based compensation by virtue of running 
securities investment trusts business. However, performance-based 
compensation can only be paid as of the termination of a trust, provided 
that the trust has been profitable.166 Furthermore, the fees incurred as a 
result of retaining third-party investment advisers should only be paid 
out of the management fees and performance-based compensation 
charged by the trust company from investors.167 This means that the 
investment adviser will have problems getting its incentive fees on a 
regular basis, as the trust company cannot get its performance-based 
compensation until the fund’s termination in the first place. However, if 
the investment adviser contributes a higher level of capital into a fund 
and thus gets more trust units in return, such regulatory restriction can 
be circumvented by paying dividends or “special trust interests” from 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Guidelines on Running the Business of Securities Investment Trusts by Trust 
Companies, supra note 25. 
 166. Id. art. 18. 
 167. Id. art. 21. 
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time to time to the investment adviser based on its holding of trust units. 
In this respect, a higher level of capital contribution by the adviser as 
seen in many sunshine funds contracts is even necessary under the 
current Chinese regulatory framework. This issue will be discussed in 
more detail in Part III.E. 
3. Covenants on Types of Investment 
This category of covenants serves to limit investment advisers 
specifically with respect to certain risky securities. Within the sunshine 
funds context, I identify two important types of covenants under this 
category, namely, restriction on types of investment and the decision 
power on expanding investment scope of a fund. Findings on the two 
types of covenants are summarized and presented in the two Tables, 
below. 
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Table 7 
Covenants on Types of Investment (N=60) 
 
Covenants Number of 
Funds 
Restrictions on investing in stocks that forecast future loss  
Not allowed at all 4 
Not allowed until the company’s performance is officially published 5 
Certain percentage restriction applies until the company’s performance is 
officially published 
18 
Allowed, if jointly agreed by the trust company and investment adviser 1 
  
Restrictions on investing in special treatment (“ST”) stocks and/or other securities 
issued by ST companies 
 
Not allowed at all 30 
Allowed but with certain percentage restrictions  11 
Allowed, if agreed by the trust company 24 
Default percentage restrictions to be forfeited if approved by the investors of the 
trust 
2 
  
Restriction on investing in derivatives (e.g., warrants)  
Not allowed at all 5 
Not allowed to actively buy in derivatives on secondary markets 2 
Allowed but with certain percentage restrictions  19 
Allowed plus certain percentage restrictions if approved by the investors of the 
trust 
1 
  
Restrictions on engaging in short selling/margin trading  
Not allowed at all 22 
Allowed, if approved by the investors of the trust 3 
Allowed, if agreed by the trust company 23 
  
Restrictions on investing in ChiNext168 stocks  
Allowed but with certain percentage restrictions 2 
  
                                                                                                                 
 168. ChiNext is specially tailored to list those enterprises engaged in independent 
innovation and other growing venture enterprises. It was only officially launched on 
Oct. 23, 2009. See Samuel Shen & Fion Li, China launches second board for start-ups, 
REUTERS, Oct. 23, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.comarticle/2009/10/23/chine 
xt-launch-idUSSHA27095520091023. 
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Restrictions on investing in the securities of related parties169  
Not allowed to invest in securities of the trust company as well as the related 
parties thereof 
18 
Not allowed to invest in securities of the companies that are related parties of the 
investment adviser 
6 
Not allowed to engage in non-arms length transactions among other funds as 
managed by the same trust company and/or the investment adviser 
1 
Not allowed to invest in those securities that may involve personal interests of 
the trust company and the investment adviser, and the managers thereof 
1 
 
  
Restrictions on investing in an exchange-traded fund (“ETF”)  
Only trade ETF within an exchange 3 
  
Obligation to invest certain percent of trust assets in securities with at least “neutral” 
or “hold” rating 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Note that the law does not generally prohibit related party transactions by trust 
companies, provided that they are carried out with fair market price and reported to the 
CBRC in advance on a transaction-by-transaction basis. See Measures for 
Administration of Trust Companies, supra note 142, art. 35. 
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Table 8 
Decisions Needed to Broaden Investment Scope (N=110) 
 
How can a decision of investment scope expansion be made? Number 
of Funds 
Investment scope not changeable 1 
All of the principals’ consent must be sought 2 
Half of the principals need to approve 13 
  
Sole decision by trust company but consent of investment adviser should be sought 11 
Sole decision by trust company provided that advance notice is made on its website 2 
  
Joint consultation and decision by the trust company and investment adviser 75 
Sole decision by investment adviser, once the trust company permits it to do so 4 
Sole decision by investment adviser 2 
 
In particular, Cumming and Johan’s 2006 paper finds that private 
equity funds in civil law countries are more likely to have covenants 
pertaining to the types of investment than private equity funds in 
common law countries.170 Since no research was presented regarding 
covenants in hedge fund partnership contracts, I cannot say whether 
their conclusion is also true within the hedge fund context by comparing 
the covenants from the two systems. However, one may have the 
impression from looking at the covenants summarized in the above two 
Tables that investment advisers have limited freedom in terms of the 
types of investments they can make. Hedge funds in developed countries 
usually advertise themselves as being able to make use of a wide range 
of sophisticated financial instruments and transactions for the purposes 
of delivering absolute returns. Apparently, Chinese hedge funds are far 
more limited in that regard. In essence, they are still at the stage of being 
“stock trading funds” rather than real “hedge funds.” This being said, 
the current cautious approach of allowing only limited types of 
investment is however understandable and even worthwhile, given that 
the Chinese capital market is a huge laboratory itself where many new 
things are still to be tested. 
It is important to note one particular point about the data presented 
above. Despite some variations, it is apparent that the trust company 
                                                                                                                 
 170. Cumming & Johan, supra note 60, at 571. 
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plays quite a role in terms of deciding what kind of investments are to be 
made or not, as well as whether to allow the investment scope expansion. 
As already mentioned above, a trust company is more like a service 
provider than a de facto fund manager for the sunshine funds created 
under its name.171 Decisions regarding which securities to invest in, at 
what price to buy in or sell out, and the number to be bought in or sold 
out, are all made by the investment adviser and contained in a document 
called the “investment plan.” A trust company normally is there only to 
conduct a formality check upon the investment plan before executing it. 
It is a “formality check” in that the trust company will only refuse to 
carry out the investment plan if the recommendations contained in the 
investment plan involve investments violating the relevant legal 
requirements or contractual stipulations in the trust contract, or when 
exogenous reasons make it impossible to trade a stock as of the time of 
the investment plan, e.g., when that stock is suspended from trading 
during preparations for periodic reporting. Thus, the trust company is 
not there to judge whether the specific investment decisions made by the 
adviser in the investment plan, i.e., those regarding how, when and at 
what price to dispose of certain securities, are good or bad. 172 That said, 
a trust company does retain an important right allowing it to have a say 
over issues on a more general level, such as what kind of securities can a 
fund invest in and what kind of transactions can a fund engage in. As 
can be seen from the two Tables above, if an investment adviser wants 
to invest in risky assets, such as special treatment stocks or warrants, or 
deploy risky trading strategies, such as short selling, or want to have a 
more liberal investment scope, it is most likely that the adviser has to 
ask for the trust company’s permission. Therefore, compared with a 
manager in a classic hedge fund partnership, an investment adviser to a 
Chinese sunshine fund enjoys most but not full discretion in making 
investment decisions, and there are times that the trust company may 
interfere, mostly on formal and general issues. Again, the reason here 
relates to the liability concern of trust companies. Since their reputation 
and interests are on the line if the investments in risky assets lead to 
investors’ losses, they have the incentive to retain the power of deciding 
whether to allow their advisers to do so in the first place. 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See supra note 107 and the accompanying text. 
 172. Summarized based on contracts in my sample. See also id. 
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4. Covenants on Fund Operation 
This category of covenants covers those issues regarding the 
general management and operation of a sunshine fund. Some covenants 
shown in the Table below can also fall under the previous sub-category 
of investment types. Table 9, below, provides a summary of the usage of 
this kind of covenants in 60 sunshine funds contracts that explicitly 
provide information on restrictive covenants (usually in a separate 
section named “Investment Restrictions”). To avoid misunderstanding, I 
excluded covenants that deal with those restrictions already expressly 
stipulated in the relevant statutes.173 
 
Table 9 
Covenants on Fund Operation Issues (N=60)* 
 
Covenants Number of 
Funds 
Not to invest the trust assets in a way that unlimited liability might be incurred 7 
Not to invest the trust assets in companies that might be convicted of violating 
laws and regulations 
2 
Not to invest all trust assets in order to keep certain liquidity 8 
Not to buy any securities within certain days174 before the expiration of fund term 4 
Not to buy any securities whose applicable lock-in period falls after the expiration 
of the fund term 
4 
Not to operate the fund with borrowed debt  5 
* Sample size is 60 because there are 60 sunshine funds contracts that explicitly provide information on 
restrictive covenants (usually in a separate section named “Investment Restrictions”). The numbers do 
not add up to 60 because some contracts simply do not touch upon certain covenants under this type in 
their “Investment Restrictions” section. 
                                                                                                                 
 173. For example, there are eight funds in my sample prohibiting using the trust 
assets to extend loans or attach any encumbrance thereon. Such a covenant, however, is 
not included in Table 9 because there is an explicit statutory provision saying that trust 
companies shall refrain from using the trust assets for purposes other than ones 
stipulated in the trust contract, nor should they use trust assets to provide collateral for 
others. See Measures for Administration of Trust Companies, supra note 142, art. 34. 
 174. Such time limits are: Western Trust Cheng Nuo No.1: 14 trading days; Western 
Trust Mingyuan Bakelai; 14 trading days; BJITIC Tong Wei Value Increase: 15 trading 
days; and FOTIC Ying Rong Da No. 1: 5 trading days. 
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5. Limitation of Investment Adviser’s Power 
The last category of covenants is also unique to Chinese hedge 
funds. Essentially, these covenants deal with a situation where an 
investment adviser will lose all of its power and the trust company will 
take over. This could happen both in the case of a particular security in a 
fund’s portfolio, and in the case of the fund as a whole. The happening 
of the latter will directly lead to the termination of the sunshine fund. 
The right of a trust company to dispose securities in a fund without 
consulting the investment adviser is called the “special transaction right.” 
To be sure, this section does not lend itself to talking about the general 
circumstances in which a trust company has the right to terminate a 
sunshine fund. After all, technically it is the trust company and not the 
investment adviser who creates a sunshine fund; it follows that the trust 
company will also have a termination right. There can be a set of such 
circumstances where the termination will simply be a natural and logical 
outcome thereof. For example, the trust company can terminate a fund 
when all the beneficiaries (i.e., investors) decide so; when the core 
managers of the investment adviser leave and there is no one else to 
replace them; when the investment adviser cooperates with other trust 
companies to launch similar trust funds without obtaining prior consent 
of the current trust company; or when the fund is so under-subscribed 
that its NAV is lower than a defined minimum amount for a certain 
period of time. 
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Table 10 
Trust Companies’ Special Transaction Right (N=112) 
 
Triggers of the Special Transaction Right Number of 
Funds 
Trust company has reason to believe that certain securities should not be held and 
thus sells them 
75 
If the unit value of trust assets falls under certain threshold,175 then trust company 
has the right to sell all trust assets to cash out. The trust will be terminated as a 
result.  
66 
50% 28 
60% 3 
70% 21 
80% 2 
>80% 9176 
Percentage not specified 3 
For the purpose of keeping enough cash for redemption and liquidity needs of the 
fund, and to the extent that cash needs are satisfied 
8 
Value of any stock in the portfolio falls under certain threshold, then sell that stock 5 
60% 1 
70% 4 
 
The situations listed Table 10, above, however, are of a different 
nature. In these cases, the decision of the trust company to sell a security 
or even to terminate a fund by selling all of the securities therein is a 
substantive one. The first category of triggers allows a trust company to 
sell certain securities if it has reason to believe that they should not be 
held. It encompasses, for example, the right of a trust company to sell a 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Note that although a trust company should impose certain appropriate “alert 
thresholds” depending on the nature of a trust fund and the market trends, and also 
diligently keep track of the market on a daily basis, it is not a mandatory statutory 
requirement to also have a “loss-stopping threshold.” A “loss-stopping threshold” 
entitles the trust company to sell trust assets and stop losses for a trust fund. Whether to 
include a “loss-stopping threshold” clause is left to the discretion of the business parties, 
and if they do agree on the clause in the trust contract, the trust company should take 
action accordingly. See Guidelines on Running the Business of Securities Investment 
Trusts by Trust Companies, supra note 25, art. 14. That said, Chinese law makes it 
mandatory that trust companies impose “loss-stopping thresholds” for structured trust 
funds, so as to limit losses for preferred class investors. See Notice of China Banking 
Regulatory Commission on Strengthening the Supervision of the Structured Trust 
Business of Trust Companies, supra note 109, art. 9.  
 176. This includes eight structured funds. 
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security when the investment adviser (or together with its related parties) 
holds more than 5% of that stock. However, this is not the real point of 
the special transaction right embodied in this trigger, as selling the stock 
to make its holding fall back under 5% is merely for legal compliance 
purposes, otherwise a disclosure will have to be made.177 Rather, it deals 
more with the situation when, for example, the market falls 3% in one 
day or 8% accumulatively for two consecutive days, or the value of the 
any stock falls under 90% of its initial cost, or trading volume of any 
stock doubles for two consecutive days.178 Upon the occurrence of any 
of these listed scenarios, the trust company will be alerted and ready 
take further actions, if necessary. It is no longer bound by the decisions 
of the investment adviser any more, even if it chooses to consult with 
the investment adviser first about the possible solutions. It can directly 
decide to sell the concerned security to stop further losses, even if the 
adviser wants to keep it for a longer period. 
As to the second category of triggers, selling thresholds (i.e., loss-
stopping thresholds) higher than 80% of the original NAV are mostly 
found within structured, as opposed to unstructured, fund contracts. The 
selling threshold for structured fund contracts is generally higher 
because investment advisers need to meet the fixed target return for their 
preferred class of investors, thus leading to a more acute need to limit 
loss than for unstructured fund contracts. Moreover, there is normally 
also a “capital add-in threshold” to serve as the first-step buffer before 
the selling threshold is reached. Therefore, a structured fund will only be 
terminated if the subordinated investors are not willing to contribute 
new capital into the fund to make up for the loss, and the fund’s NAV 
keeps falling toward the selling threshold. In any case, cashing out all 
securities and terminating a fund is a substantive right of the trust 
company leading to a serious outcome, as it deprives the investment 
adviser of the chance to reverse the losses by changing its strategy and 
trying again. 
                                                                                                                 
 177. If an investor’s holdings reach 5% of the issued shares of a listed company, a 
disclosure must be made within three days. See art. 13, Shangshi gongsi shougou guanli 
banfa [Regulations on the Takeover of Listed Companies] (promulgated by the CSRC, 
July 31, 2006) (amended Aug. 27, 2008), LAWINFOCHINA, available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com. 
 178. These circumstances are expressly stipulated in SZITIC trust contracts, and the 
trust company may, upon the occurrence of such circumstances, exercise its special 
transaction right to sell a stock without consulting the investment adviser. Trust 
contracts from other trust companies have similar stipulations of such circumstances. 
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It is not hard to understand why so many trust companies choose to 
retain the special transaction rights. As the party signing the trust 
contract with investors directly, a trust company bears more risk than the 
investment adviser of becoming the target of a lawsuit if the fund’s 
losses make investors unhappy. In this sense, the existence of a special 
transaction rights can serve as a liability exemption or reduction 
disclaimer against the accusation that “the trust company has failed to 
fulfill its duty to monitor the investment adviser and stop losses.”179 
Such disclaimer, although effectively limiting the potential liabilities 
that may be charged upon trust companies, comes at the cost of 
sacrificing investment advisers’ decision power in very important 
circumstances. In this sense, trust companies are not merely playing the 
role of transaction executors, but also the role of substantive decision 
makers in Chinese hedge funds. As long as trust companies are 
providing investment advisers with the trust platform on which to base 
sunshine funds, it is not likely for them to give up their special 
transaction rights. Industry practitioners thus would be curiously 
anticipating the prospective development of limited-partnership-
organized hedge funds, especially in terms of their potential to 
overcome the inherent shortcomings (such as special transaction rights) 
of trust-organized ones. 
E. COMPENSATION 
Since sunshine funds are based on trusts, the compensation 
mechanisms in their contracts also have some unique aspects that reflect 
this fact. In simple words, the fixed and flexible fees paid by investors 
of a fund are shared between the investment adviser and the trust 
company, with the former taking a larger portion. The following two 
Tables summarize some important features of compensation 
                                                                                                                 
 179. Such an accusation was raised by investors in a lawsuit against SZITIC, as a 
result of the huge losses (more than 60%) of Xinpeng No. 1, a sunshine fund created 
under its name. See Dan Youwei, Huarun xintuo yu kehu duibu gongtang: cheng 
Xinpeng 1 qi bucunzai qizha [SZITIC Responded on the Lawsuit Brought by Its Clients: 
We Did Not Defraud on Xinpeng Trust Contract], SHANGHAI ZHENGQUAN BAO 
[SHANGHAI SECURITIES NEWS], Dec. 22, 2009, available at http://news.hexun.com/20 
09-12-22/122110286.html. 
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mechanisms of 82 sunshine funds in my sample that provided 
information on fees and compensation. 
 
Table 11 
Fee Levels of Sunshine Funds (N=82)* 
 
Flexible Fees: 
 
Investment Adviser / 
Trust Company 
 
Number 
of 
Funds 
Fixed Fees: 
 
Investment*** 
Adviser 
 
Number 
of 
Funds 
Fixed Fees: 
 
Trust 
Company*** 
 
Number 
of 
Funds 
Combination = 20% 67 0% 11 0.50% 4 
12% / 8% 1 0.25% 24 0.75% 1 
15% / 5% 3 0.30% 1 0.90% 1 
16% / 4% 1 0.40% 2 1.00% 32 
    Fixed amount + 
extra 1% if NAV 
is greater than 
100% of its 
original value 
1 
17% / 3% 37 0.50% 12 1.15% 1 
17.5% / 1.5% 1 0.75% 5 1.25% 6 
18% / 2% 3 1% 2 1.30% 7 
18.5% / 1.5% 4 1.50% 2 1.30% if fund size 
as of inception is 
not greater than 
100 million + 1% 
for the portion 
exceeding 100 
million if the fund 
size as of inception 
is over 100 million  
1 
20% / 0% 17   1.50% 12 
Combination > 20% 5   1.70% 1 
19% / 3%** 1   1.75% 1 
20% / 2% 2   2% 1 
30% / 0% 1     
35% / 0% 1     
      
* The numbers in the Table might not add up to 82 because in some cases, the specific proportion of 
split is not given. 
** This proportion is only applicable during the first year of the fund. Afterwards, the proportion is 
changed into 17%/3%. See the contract of SZITIC Hengda Tonghui No.1. 
*** The two columns of fixed fees should be read separately from each other. They are sorted from low 
to high under each column, but the numbers in the same row are not related to each other, e.g., the 0% 
and 0.5% in the first row does not mean a 0%/5% split of fixed fees between adviser and trust company. 
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Table 12 
Usage of High Water Mark (N=78) 
 
Usage of High Water Mark Number 
of Funds 
Typical high water mark, with hurdle rate 2 
Typical high water mark, no hurdle rate 65 
Hurdle rate, no high water mark 3 
Revised or no high water mark, no hurdle rate 8 
Difference between the NAV of the compensation payment day and the purchase  
price of trust units 
2 
Flexible fees paid yearly, based on the difference of the NAV of year end between  
the NAV of year beginning 
1 
Difference between the NAV of the current compensation payment day and the  
NAV of the last payment day 
1 
Highest historical NAV during the past 12 months 4 
 
Similar to the typical hedge fund industry practice, the 
performance-based flexible fees in Chinese sunshine funds also largely 
cluster at 20%. However, what is different is that the 20% needs to be 
split between the investment adviser and the trust company, and the 
most frequently seen proportion of such a split is 17% to the investment 
adviser and 3% to the trust company. Fixed management fees are also 
split; however, if adding the investment adviser’s portion with the trust 
company’s portion, the sum does not cluster at 2%. As shown in Table 
11, above, the level of fixed management fees charged by trust 
companies is generally at a higher level than that charged by investment 
advisers. The usage of a high water mark is also identified as a prevalent 
practice among sunshine funds. A high water mark is defined in most 
contracts as the highest historical NAV; it has been used in a few 
contracts with twists to this meaning to make the conditions of 
compensation payouts less stringent, as shown in Table 12, above. 
As already mentioned in Part III.D.2, a regulation that took effect in 
February 2009 introduced into the industry some very strange legal 
requirements. According to that regulation, performance-based 
compensation can only be paid as of the termination of a trust provided 
that the trust remains profitable.180 Furthermore, the fees incurred as a 
result of retaining third-party investment advisers should only be paid 
                                                                                                                 
 180. See supra note 166 and the accompanying text. 
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out of the management fees and performance-based compensation 
charged by the trust company from investors. 181  Such requirements 
might be well-meant. For example, it may be that the regulatory 
authorities do not want investors to bear the obligation of paying 
sunshine funds managers (trust company and investment adviser) on a 
periodic basis, when the NAV of these funds can be so volatile182 that, in 
the end, investors will only earn nominal returns compared to the 
accumulated amount of fees they have paid out. They may also have 
gotten the inspiration from the compensation mechanism of private 
equity funds, which normally require general partners to return part or 
all of the capital committed or invested by limited partners before they 
can share the 20% carried interests.183 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that certain changes have been 
evolving among hedge funds as a result of the shock to the industry 
brought about by the 2008 financial crisis. According to Job Search 
Digest’s 2010 Hedge Fund Compensation Report, many funds are 
contemplating a new form of partnership with their LPs in exchange for 
money being locked in for a longer period of time.184 For this purpose, 
they will, among other things, charge the incentive fee in two or three-
year rolling cycles as opposed to the current norm of annual or semi-
annual payment. In this respect, the hedge fund industry’s compensation 
structure is also partially converging toward that of the private equity 
industry.185 
Although making perfect sense within a private equity context 
where long-horizon investments and lack of liquidity are the norm, the 
arrangement that carried interest is only payable upon the investors’ 
recoupment of their contributed capital might not be an ideal solution to 
incentivizing hedge funds managers. Hedge fund incentive fees are often 
viewed as having option-like characteristics.186 Incentive fees are earned 
                                                                                                                 
 181. See supra note 167 and the accompanying text. 
 182. Indeed, it has been submitted that Chinese hedge funds in general still lack the 
ability to maintain a relatively stable level of high returns. Rather, their NAV curves are 
quite volatile, which is also a result of the high volatility of the Chinese stock market. 
See Zhang, Reward for Reputation, supra note 150. 
 183. TOLL, supra note 151, at 51. 
 184. Job Search Digest, The 2010 Hedge Fund Compensation Report 11 (2010) (on 
file with author). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See, e.g., Carl Ackermann et al., The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk, 
Return and Incentives, 54 J. OF FIN. 833, 840 (1999); see also William N. Goetzmann et 
 2012] AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF TRUST  133 
CONTRACTS OF CHINESE HEDGE FUNDS 
 
when the fund’s performance exceeds a high-water mark, which is 
analogous to a call option with the high-water mark as the strike price. 
Managers are incentivized to work hard and keep the fund value above 
the high-water mark in order to assure that their incentive options will 
finish in the money.187 However, if they can only exercise their options 
at the end of the game, but not periodically throughout the life of the 
fund, their incentives are dampened. Opportunistic fund managers may 
fail to manage their funds diligently until they approach the end of their 
terms. For example, if they lose money during a certain period, they 
may feel a less urgent need to adjust their trading strategy to stop the 
losses and recoup some of their losses as soon as possible, as they will 
not be rewarded even if they indeed manage to make money for the next 
period and there is enough time to try out before the end of fund term 
anyway. Alternatively, they could choose to comfortably maintain a 
conservative trading strategy so that they can secure a modest 
compensation at the termination. Either way, it is unlikely that fund 
managers will constantly exert their best efforts to maximize the net 
asset value when running the fund. This is apparently not in the best 
interest of the investors. Different from private equity, the primary focus 
of hedge funds on active short term trading of public securities requires 
fund managers to actively monitor the market and work consistently to 
trade in and out; otherwise many money-making or loss-stopping 
opportunities may be missed in the blink of an eye. In this respect, the 
one-time-at-termination compensation system may work poorly despite 
its well-meant intention. 
Regardless of the real motive for regulators to impose such 
apparently strange requirements, the rules are already promulgated and 
industry players should comply. It would thus be natural to predict that 
funds created as of February 2009, the effectuation date of the 
Guidelines on Running the Business of Securities Investment Trusts by 
Trust Companies, should have complied by changing the language of 
their compensation clauses to allow payment of flexible fees only upon 
termination. This is because performance-based compensation can only 
                                                                                                                 
al., supra note 33, at 1687; James E. Hodder & Jens Carsten Jackwerth, Incentive 
Contracts and Hedge Fund Management, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 811, 
812 (2007). 
 187. Hodder & Jackwerth, supra note 186. 
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be paid at the termination of a profitable trust pursuant to the 
regulation. 188  However, a look at the contracts in my sample—
recognizing the limited nature of the sample 189 —does not seem to 
support such a prediction. Only one unstructured fund190 out of the 55 
fund contracts that (a) were dated prior to or in February 2009 and (b) 
contained information on trust company and/or investment adviser 
compensation stipulated for compensation payment upon termination. 
After this cut-off point, only two unstructured funds191 out of 27 fund 
contracts that were (a) dated after February 2009 and (b) contained 
information on trust company and/or investment adviser compensation 
stipulated for compensation payment upon termination.192 Given such an 
apparently low rate of compliance with the February 2009 regulations, 
one may wonder what strategies trust companies and investment 
advisers might have crafted to adapt to the unfavorable legal 
requirements. As far as my sample shows, four strategies can be 
identified. 
. 
1. Temporarily No Performance-Based Compensation; to be 
Resumed if Allowed by Law in the Future  
The point of this strategy is that once the ban is lifted by a new law 
and the fund managers (trust company and investment adviser) are 
                                                                                                                 
188. See supra notes 165-67. 
189. See supra Parts III.A, III.B for a discussion of the limitations of the sample. 
The reader is reminded that the sample consists of unexecuted documents obtained 
from online sources, and that the sample covers approximately one-sixth of the 
sunshine funds listed in the Go-Goal database as of August 9, 2010.  
 190. I only refer to unstructured funds here because structured fund fees are 
normally paid at termination with or without the 2009 regulation in place, given that 
these funds normally only have less than five years of life by their design anyway, see 
supra note 124. The name of this unstructured fund is Western Trust Cheng Nuo No. 1. 
 191. The two funds are: CRTrust Xin Lan Rui No. 2 and XMITIC Puer Qilin. 
 192. Among the 27 funds, there is one fund, namely, SZITIC Tong Wei No. 1, that 
did not seem to adopt any particular strategy to mitigate against unfavorable regulations. 
Arguably, I would not consider this a case of non-compliance, because the fund was 
officially set up in March 2009. Normally, it would take some time before fund 
managers could raise enough capital from investors and then officially set up a fund. 
Therefore, the March establishment of SZITIC Tong Wei No. 1 very likely shows that 
the trust documents were already executed by investors earlier than February 2009, thus 
making the regulation not applicable to the fund. 
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allowed to charge fees periodically again, the new fees to be charged 
then will be substantially raised to make up for the previous loss of fees. 
This strategy has been adopted by one fund.193 
2. Trust Companies’ Fixed Fees and Flexible Compensation 
Combined Together and Called “Trust Management Fee”; 
Investment Advisers’ Flexible Incentive Fees Received as 
“Special Trust Interests” 
Although this strategy sounds like a “words game,” it has been 
employed by seven funds.194 The rationale behind this strategy is quite 
straightforward. Previously, trust companies’ compensation was usually 
expressed as consisting of two portions, namely, a fixed fee (in most 
cases 1%) and a performance-based compensation (in most cases 3%, as 
shown in Table 11, above). Since the requirement in the 2009 regulation 
only limits the payment of performance-based compensation and not the 
fixed part,195 the limitations can be circumvented if the trust company is 
only going to receive a fixed fee and not flexible one. As such, what 
these seven funds did was to increase the level of the fixed management 
fee, effectively covering the flexible fee. The investment adviser will 
share with the trust company the fixed fee, without charging a 
performance-based “fee” in exchange for its “investment advisory 
services.” What it will receive is the so-called “special trust interest” as 
a result of its identity as the “special beneficiary” of the sunshine fund. 
There is usually one clause at the very beginning of fund contracts that 
requires fund investors to agree to appoint the investment adviser as the 
“special beneficiary.” This appointment, coupled with the fact that an 
investment adviser is usually required to contribute and hold at least 10% 
of the fund’s capital, will fortify its right to receive “special trust 
interests.” These trust interests are special in that they are paid more 
frequently, such as monthly or quarterly, are paid based on high water 
mark, and are paid prior to the receipt by normal investors of their 
“ordinary trust interests.” Essentially, this arrangement resembles the 
                                                                                                                 
 193. This fund is called Ping An Fortune Tong Wei No. 1. 
 194. These seven funds are: SZITIC He Ying Fine Selection No.1, SZITIC Zhi 
Cheng No. 2, No. 3, No.4 and No. 5, SZITIC Hengda Tonghui No. 1, and FOTIC 
Steady Value Increase (Yongsheng Huiyuan). 
 195. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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old incentive-based fees, but adapts to the regulatory change by using a 
different structure. 
It is worth pointing out that, although the “special trust interests” 
arrangement looks more sophisticated than the idea of an 
“encompassing management fee,” it is actually not new to Chinese 
hedge funds. As far as I can see in my sample, the earliest contract 
adopting a “special trust interests” arrangement is PureHeart China 
Growth I Fund, established in May 2006 by Ping An Trust. The earlier 
two funds managed by the same investment adviser, including China’s 
very first hedge fund, PureHeart Fund, established in February 2004 by 
SZITIC, used the direct wording of “performance-based compensation.” 
It is not clear at this point why the third fund managed by the same 
adviser used different treatment on this issue than its previous two 
counterparts. A reasonable deduction may be that the name “special 
trust interest” sounds milder to investors and fits better into the “trust” 
context. After all, the hedge fund business was and still is novel in 
China, and Chinese investors might find it difficult to accept that 
someone can share as much as almost 20% of their profits simply by 
providing “investment advice” to their trustee. Regardless, such an 
arrangement apparently worked to mitigate the impact of the 2009 new 
regulation on China’s hedge fund industry; otherwise the consequences 
might have been much more severe. A related interesting finding is how 
this arrangement has been made more sophisticated alongside the 
development of sunshine funds. A typical variation to the original 
“special beneficiary” treatment would give an investment adviser the 
status of a “principal” of the trust, where it is appointed as the 
“representative of all principals” by all the other investors by entering 
into the contract. As such, the trust company has the obligation to 
consult and listen to the “principals’ representative” in managing the 
fund, and the investment adviser thus receives its “special trust interest” 
based on such status and work. 
3. Trust Company Designated Together with Investment Adviser as 
Special Beneficiary to Share Special Trust Interests 
The third alternative is based on a similar rationale as the second 
one but the twist is elsewhere. Under this strategy, investors designate 
both the investment adviser and the trust company as the special 
beneficiaries of the sunshine trust fund. Since special trust interests can 
be paid much more frequently as long as the fund’s new profits exceeds 
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its high water mark, this solves the problem posed by the 2009 new 
regulation that a trust company is only able to receive its flexible 
compensation as of fund termination. Two funds have adopted this 
strategy.196 
4. Flexible Fees Payable Upon Investors’ Redemption 
This is a partial compliance strategy, but nonetheless based on 
reasonable grounds. After all, the trust company and investment adviser 
will not be able to get their fees if their investors have already left the 
fund by redemption. This strategy has been adopted by two funds.197 
With these strategies adopted by Chinese sunshine funds, as 
discussed above, it is no longer a mystery why the compliance rate for 
the “flexible compensation payment upon fund termination” 
requirement, as stipulated in the regulation promulgated in 2009198 is so 
low at first sight. Chinese hedge funds emerged by borrowing from 
foreign experience, but they grew with their own characteristics from 
the very first day. They have shown remarkable competence to 
overcome unfavorable regulatory limitations and find new ways for 
further development of the business. Of course, it remains to be seen 
how the regulatory authorities will react to these apparent circumvention 
strategies of sunshine funds, and, more generally, how Chinese 
regulatory authorities are going to define their role in the regulation of 
hedge funds. New and interesting findings may be generated by further 
research when the industry is more mature structurally and when the 
regulatory framework is more developed. 
CONCLUSION 
While the hedge funds industry is already a trillion dollar business 
in the developed world, it is still in its infancy stage in China. Organized 
as trusts, Chinese hedge funds take drastically different business forms 
than LPs, making it more difficult for researchers to understand them. 
This is a very interesting area that has not been researched thoroughly, 
                                                                                                                 
 196. These two funds are: CITIC He Ju No. 1, and CITIC He Ying No. 1. 
 197. These two funds are CQITIC Chuan Shi No. 1, and ZRTrust Hun Dun No. 2. 
 198. See supra notes 165-67. 
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and this article is, to my knowledge, the first research exploring the 
contractual arrangements of Chinese hedge fund agreements. 
Using 139 contracts and explanations of trust plans of sunshine 
funds collected by hand based on the list of securities investment trusts 
provided by Go-Goal database, this article analyzed the structure, 
covenants, and compensation mechanisms of sunshine funds. They have 
been organized as trusts primarily because private fund managers cannot 
legally pool capital from investors, and a trust was thus far the most 
appropriate platform offered under the Chinese regulatory framework 
for that purpose. As the article demonstrates, on the one hand, sunshine 
funds do have similar contractual arrangements as typical LP-organized 
hedge funds, such as charging, on top of a fixed management fee, a 
performance-based compensation, which also largely cluster at 20%. On 
the other hand, they are also undeniably different from LP-organized 
hedge funds, due to jurisdiction-specific characteristics of China. The 
most crucial difference is the involvement of the trust company in the 
fund. Normally, it is merely a transaction executor responsible for 
carrying out investment orders from the investment adviser. The trust 
company also shares with the investment adviser a small portion of 
performance-based compensation in exchange for such services to the 
fund. However, because relying on trust companies has been the only 
practical way for Chinese hedge fund managers to conduct the business, 
and trust companies are the real contractual parties signing the trust 
contracts with investors, investment advisers also need to accept certain 
conditions that are much more stringent than mere profit sharing, such 
as a higher level of fund manager capital contribution and narrowed 
decision making power. Typically, an investment adviser (de facto 
manager) to a sunshine fund in China is required to contribute or hold at 
least 10% of the fund’s total assets. If a fund fails to perform well, the 
trust company retains the power to sell all of the fund’s assets and 
terminate the fund without consulting with the investment adviser. 
Although harsh and even incentive dampening, these China-
specific covenants and arrangements in sunshine funds contracts are 
unlikely to be eliminated as long as trust companies remain involved. 
This is because trust companies require some measures to protect their 
pecuniary interests and reputational capital from being hurt as a result of 
acting as a direct contractual party with investors. Moreover, given the 
deep-rooted influence of civil law tradition and that hedge funds are still 
mostly unheard of, Chinese investors may find it difficult to accept 
certain highly contractual arrangements. Rather, they would prefer 
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something more straightforward and consistent with their past 
experience, even if the former is more incentive-aligning and the latter is 
incentive-twisting on the part of the investment adviser. A typical 
example is that Chinese sunshine funds abandon in their contracts the 
arrangement of nominal general partner capital contribution and big 
performance-based compensation. It is the regulatory and institutional 
settings that shaped the contractual covenants in sunshine fund 
agreements. 
It remains to be seen how the Chinese hedge funds industry will 
develop in the future. At present, many new things are being attempted, 
and new regulations are frequently being promulgated, yet at a low level 
of consistency and, apparently, lacking in-depth consideration. 
Emerging as an alternative investment vehicle and originated from the 
gray regulatory areas, Chinese sunshine funds have demonstrated 
remarkable competence by taking advantage of favorable legal 
provisions and apparently adapting to unfavorable ones. Currently, the 
industry is expecting to see how the newly materialized limited 
partnership would shape the future development of hedge funds in China. 
It is critical that regulators achieve a proper balance in regulating 
China’s hedge fund industry. 
 
